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ABSTRACT
Access to justice efforts have been focused more on access than justice, due in
part to the framing of access to justice issues around the presence or absence of
lawyers. This article argues that access to justice scholars and activists should
also think about social justice and provides a roadmap for running a legal
services program geared toward making court systems more just. The article also
further develops the concept of “poor people’s courts,” a term that has been used
to describe courts serving large numbers of low-income people without
representation. The article argues that access to justice efforts can and should
prioritize responses that address the unique, subordinating impacts of these
courts, including those relating to race, class and gender bias, state intervention,
and the punitive effects of intersecting state systems. In this context, the article
proposes a new theory of access to justice as a counter-hegemonic practice; one
that is aimed at challenging dominant ideologies and transforming subordinating
systems, as well as delivering legal services.
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“In institutions cultural meaning, social inequality, and legal consciousness
are forged.”1
“Poverty creates an abrasive interface with society; poor people are always
bumping into sharp legal things.”2
INTRODUCTION
Access to justice interventions aimed at low-income, unrepresented litigants
have been largely focused on providing access rather than justice; individualized,
case-based legal services uninformed by social change goals.3 This article
advocates for a social justice approach, arguing that a structural analysis that
interrogates the role of the coercive state is required to effectively address access
to justice in courts frequented by poor people.4 Specifically, this article uses the
term “poor people’s courts” to refer to state civil courts serving large numbers of
low-income, unrepresented litigants—namely, family, housing, and small claims
and other consumer courts.5 A social justice approach requires connecting access
1. Susan S. Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 323, 360 (2005).
2. Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1050 (1970).
3. See Gary Smith, Poverty Warriors: A Historical Perspective on the Mission of Legal Services, 45
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. OF POVERTY L. & POL’Y 34, 36 (2011) [hereinafter Smith, Poverty Warriors]
(“The term ‘equal access to justice’ is a modern formulation, unknown in the 1960s, that describes
piecemeal assistance to handle the personal legal problems of disconnected individual clients who cannot
afford lawyers, without necessary reference to the critical needs of the larger poor community”). Some
scholars date the concept of access to justice further back in time, but also limit it to access concerns. See,
e.g., Marc Galanter, Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social Capability, 37 FORDHAM URB. L. J.
115, 116 (2010). Galanter describes access to justice initiatives as occurring in three waves, “beginning in
1965 with the Office of Economic Opportunity’s neighborhood law firms program, [which] involved the
reform of institutions for delivering legal services to the poor.” Id. at 116 (quoting ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND
THE WELFARE STATE 4 (Mauro Cappelletti, ed. 1981)). Galanter further states that the concept of access to
justice as access to judicial institutions dates back to the 1850s, and the concept expanded to access to all
sorts of dispute resolution processes in the late 1970s. Id. at 115–16. See also Gary Blasi, Framing Access
to Justice: Beyond Perceived Justice For Individuals, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 913, 914 (2009) [hereinafter
Blasi, Framing Access to Justice] (observing that access to justice is framed in narrow terms).
4. See infra Part II (detailing how access to justice interventions may reinforce subordination).
5. Recent studies show that most litigants in family court, tenants in housing court, and consumers in
small claims and other consumer courts are unrepresented by counsel, and are unable to obtain
representation for financial reasons. See Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon:
What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L .J. 35, 41–43
(2009) [hereinafter Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon] (summarizing reports on
rates of self-representation in housing, small claims, and family law cases). Other scholars have referred
to courts with these characteristics as “poor people’s courts.” See id. at 39 (referring to family, housing,
and consumer courts as “poor people’s courts”); see also Benjamin Mueller, Dispute Over Family Courts
Leaves Family Courts in Limbo, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/16/
nyregion/dispute-over-judges-leaves-new-york-family-courts-in-limbo.html (quoting law professor Cyn-
thia Godsoe as referring to the New York family court as “the poor people’s court”); Caroline Kearney,
Pedagogy in a Poor People’s Court: The First Year of a Child Support Clinic, 19 N.M. L. REV. 175, 180
(1989) (identifying child support courts as a poor people’s court). Some scholars have included
administrative and criminal courts in the concept of poor people’s courts. See Steven Keith Berensen,
Preparing Clinical Law Students for Advocacy in Poor People’s Courts, 43 N.M. L. REV. 363, 363 (2013)
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to justice in poor people’s courts to relevant discourses about subordination, the
operation of state power, and progressive law practice—discourses from which
much access to justice work has been disengaged.
A. Disconnects Between Discourses
In particular, there is often a seeming disconnect between the large and varied
literature detailing the deeply problematic character of the poor people’s courts
and discussions about access to justice. This literature includes work by poverty
lawyers, often drawing on personal experience to detail the ways in which poor
people’s courts present structural obstacles to justice for low-income litigants;6
studies demonstrating how structural barriers to counsel result in different
outcomes for unrepresented litigants in family,7 housing,8 and small claims;9
(adding bankruptcy and some criminal courts to Engler’s use of the term). I focus on state civil courts for
clarity.
6. See, e.g., Leah Hill, Do You See What I See? Reflections on How Bias Infiltrates the New York City
Family Court—the Case of the Court Ordered Investigation, COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 527 (2007)
(describing structural barriers to justice in New York City’s Family Court); Barbara Bezdek, Silence in
the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 533 (1992) (describing barriers in housing court); Emily Jane Goodman, Housing Court: The New
York Tenant Experience, 17 URB. L. ANN 57, 61 (1979) (same). Cf. Lucie E. White, Subordination,
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, (1990)
[hereinafter White, Sunday Shoes] (describing structural barriers to justice for poor women of color).
7. See, e.g., ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL
DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 108–09, 300 (1992) (reporting significant differences in rates of awards for joint
legal and physical custody depending on whether one or both parties were represented); WOMEN’S LAW
CTR. OF MD., INC., FAMILIES IN TRANSITION: A FOLLOW-UP STUDY EXPLORING FAMILY LAW ISSUES IN
MARYLAND 66 (2006), available at http://www.wlcmd.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Families-in-
Transition.pdf. See also id. at 48 tbl.16; Jane Ellis, Plans, Protections, and Professional Intervention:
Innovations in Divorce Custody Reform and the Role of Legal Professionals, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
65, 132 (1990); Jane Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers and Judges to
Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 499, 511–12 (2003) (reporting that
eighty-three percent of women seeking domestic violence protection orders who had an attorney were
successful in getting the order, while only thirty-two percent of women without an attorney were
successful).
8. See Chester Hartman & David Robinson, Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem, 14 HOUSING
POL’Y DEBATE 461, 477–78 (2003) (providing an overview of studies of the eviction process). As noted by
Engler, “The titles [of reports on courts processing housing cases] capture the perilous fate awaiting
unrepresented tenants.” Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon, supra note 5, at 46. See,
e.g., WILLIAM E. MORRIS INST. FOR JUSTICE, INJUSTICE IN NO TIME: THE EXPERIENCE OF TENANTS IN
MARICOPA COUNTY JUSTICE COURTS (2005); LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR BETTER HOUSING, NO TIME FOR
JUSTICE: A STUDY OF CHICAGO’S EVICTION COURT (2003); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ACCESS TO JUSTICE
PROJECT, JUSTICE EVICTED: AN INQUIRY INTO HOUSING COURT PROBLEMS (1987); Anthony J. Fusco, Jr.
et al., Chicago’s Eviction Court: A Tenant’s Court of No Resort, 17 URB. L. ANN. 93 (1979).
9. See, e.g., DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 8–9, 215–21
(1974) (finding a default rate of over ninety percent among unrepresented consumers in small claims
cases in New York, Chicago, and Detroit); CTR. FOR AUTO SAFETY, LITTLE INJUSTICES: SMALL CLAIMS
COURTS AND THE AMERICAN CONSUMER 98 (1972) (reporting similar findings in Boston Municipal Court).
See also Austin Sarat, Alternatives in Dispute Processing: Litigation in a Small Claims Court, 10 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 341, 367 (1976) (finding that represented plaintiffs in New York small claims court facing
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work by clinical teaching scholars on the ways in which poor people’s courts
present unique challenges for lawyering (and thus teaching about practice);10 and
studies documenting pervasive bias in the courts.11 This work establishes that
poor people’s courts are not merely neutral spaces within the state where the poor
go to access resources, resolve disputes, and seek justice. Rather, they are sites of
coercive state power, where individuals already vulnerable to punitive state
interventions may encounter additional, unwanted interventions into their lives
and families, lose rights, and suffer less immediately tangible harm, such as to
their autonomy and legal consciousness.12 However, access to justice initiatives
are not typically designed to address the systemic and intersectional disadvan-
tages faced by low-income people in poor people’s courts, like judicial bias or
unwanted state interventions.13 The result (embedded in the term access to justice
itself) is to imply that there is justice on the other side of access; that, if the
correct measure of access to a tribunal is provided, then justice—or, at least,
greater justice—is provided as well. This problem is exacerbated by access to
justice discourses focused on the presence or absence of attorneys, which have
tended to limit the scope of issues considered.14
For example, access to justice rhetoric sometimes characterizes attorneys as
the enemies of access. In this view, access is limited by the complexity of
procedures designed with attorneys in mind and thought to benefit them alone.15
This characterization obscures the role of the state in problems experienced by
poor people in the justice system and advocacy’s potential role in challenging
subordination. However, while some reformers fight for expanding the right to
unrepresented defendants recovered two-thirds or more of their claimed awards 71.4% of the time, while
unrepresented plaintiffs facing represented defendants recovered that amount only 13.5% of the time).
10. See, e.g., Berensen, supra note 5; Kearney, supra note 5.
11. Findings of gender bias are published in reports of state court task forces from more than thirty
states, Puerto Rico, the Ninth Circuit, and the District of Columbia Circuit. See generally Jeannette F.
Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of State Task Forces, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 2 n.1 (1996). Some court systems have studied and found bias based on other factors
as well, including race and ethnicity. See Judith Resnik, Asking About Gender in Courts, 21 SIGNS 952
(1996) (providing a bibliography of task force reports). For links to racial and gender fairness task forces
and reports, see Gender and Racial Fairness State Links, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., http://ncsc.org/
Topics/Access-and-Fairness/Gender-and-Racial-Fairness/State-Links.aspx?cat!Gender%20Fairness%2
0Task%20Forces%20and%20Reports (last visited Mar. 8, 2015).
12. See infra Part II (discussing the impacts of the poor people’s courts on vulnerable communities
and likening it to ritual degradation).
13. See infra Part II (describing the limitations of current approaches to Civil Gideon and self-help).
14. See infra Part II.
15. For example, multiple speakers at a recent access to justice conference, Until Civil Gideon:
Expanding Access to Justice, held at Fordham University School of Law on November 1, 2013,
advocated focusing on simplification of the procedures, forms, and substantive law that participants
characterized as necessitating (and impliedly benefiting) attorneys alone. See notes on file with author.
See also Benjamin Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV. 1227,
1229 (2010); Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: A Roadmap for Reform, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1227,
1231 (2014) [hereinafter Rhode, Roadmap] (describing the legal system as “unduly lawyer-centric”).
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counsel in civil cases,16 or relaxing the rules against the unauthorized practice of
law to permit non-attorney advocates,17 they do so without a theory of advocacy
that addresses the ways in which advocates in poor people’s courts are sometimes
part of the problem.18 Similarly, other common access to justice initiatives—such
as making courts more accessible by simplifying forms and procedures,
providing legal information and assistance through self-help programs and
services, and changing judicial practices about assisting unrepresented litigants
in court proceedings—are too often implemented without regard to court cultures
and practices that put litigants at risk of losing substantive rights and experienc-
ing dignitary harms.19 If we instead examine the distinct ways in which the law
operates for poor people through legal institutions, new and more expansive
goals for access to justice emerge, along with more promising approaches to
familiar practices. This article undertakes this effort by identifying the unique
functions of poor people’s courts in reinforcing subordination and expanding
state power.20
B. Examining Poor People’s Courts
This article builds this analysis from an in-depth study of the quintessential
poor people’s court: family court. This examination, which traces the ways in
which family courts have impacted low-income litigants throughout family court
history, is essential. Prior scholarship has characterized features associated with
family courts, such as informality and interventionism, as recent developments,21
16. See Barton, supra note 15 (observing that “bar associations, academics, and poverty lawyers are
working harder on civil Gideon than ever,” and providing examples of recent efforts).
17. Deborah Rhode has been the most outspoken advocate for an expanded role for non-attorneys in
access to justice efforts. See Rhode, Roadmap, supra note 15; Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the
Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions,
34 STAN. L REV. 1, 79 (1981); Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective: Alternative Approaches
to Non-lawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 701, 710 (1996); Deborah L. Rhode, The
Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209, 230 (1990); DEBORAH L.
RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 87 (2004). See also Alex J. Hurder, Nonlawyer Legal Assistance and Access to
Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241, 2241 (1999) (referring to non-attorney legal assistance as “a
necessary ingredient of any plan for meaningful access to the courts”).
18. See infra Part II (discussing implications of the absence of a counter-hegemonic theory for access
to justice efforts). An important exception to this tendency is the work of Gary Blasi, which has
influenced the development of my thinking about these issues. See, e.g., Blasi, Framing Access to Justice,
supra note 3 (arguing for a more expansive view of access to justice); see also infra Part II (discussing
Blasi’s critique of Civil Gideon).
19. See infra Part II (describing degradation ceremonies in the poor people’s courts).
20. See infra Part I (describing regulation of the poor in family courts); Part II (describing the
hegemonic functions of the poor people’s courts).
21. See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Revitalizing the Adversary System in Family Law, 78 U. CINN. L. REV.
891, 894–97 (2010) [hereinafter Murphy, Revitalizing the Adversary System] (positing a “paradigm shift”
in the way that disputes are resolved in family courts); Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse,
Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727,
731–33 (1988) (describing mediators and social workers supplanting legal actors in family courts as a
recent phenomenon).
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or as “bad seeds,” disconnected from the essential, historical functions of the
court.22 Such approaches illuminate important problems but omit the ways in
which these characteristics are intrinsic to the institutional culture and history of
family courts, and to the subordination of low-income people.23 In addition,
following a broad historical overview, this article focuses on cases between
private litigants. Regulation of the family through state action in juvenile and
child welfare actions in family courts is well documented.24 Cases where
low-income people are litigating against one another in family court are less well
recognized as implicating social justice in the sense of redistributing resources
and reallocating power between haves and have-nots, or the state and the poor.25
This article shows, however, that the operation of the state reinforces hierarchies
including those relating to race, gender, and class in private, as well as
22. See Robert J. Levy, Custody Investigations in Divorce Cases, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 713,
718–28 (1986) (blaming the practice of custody investigations on divorce reformers who have adopted
the rhetoric of nineteenth century juvenile court “child savers‘); Herma Hill Kay, A Family Court: The
California Proposal, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1205 (1968) (analogizing contemporary calls for a family court to
juvenile court ideology); Robert Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 236, 229, 266 (1975) (distinguishing the resolution of private
disputes in family courts to the child protection function of juvenile courts).
23. See infra Part I (showing that informality and interventionism, along with the intersection of
family courts with criminal justice and social welfare systems, constitute the court’s essential,
“delegalized” nature). Family court history also suggests the intractability of these features, such that
changing rules will likely not greatly change the ways in which these courts operate, especially for poor
people. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997) (noting how legal institutions preserve
social stratification through transformation of rules justifying rhetoric over time).
24. In particular, Dorothy Roberts has documented state regulation of the black family through the
child welfare system. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002)
[hereinafter ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS]; Dorothy Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systematic
Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474 (2012). For a classic treatment of state regulation
of immigrants and the poor through the juvenile justice system, see ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD
SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (1969). For an example of recent scholarship highlighting the
racial aspects of state regulation in juvenile justice, see Cheryl Nelson Butler, Blackness as Delinquency,
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1335 (2013).
25. See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Political Lawyering, One Person at a Time: The Challenge of Legal
Work Against Domestic Violence for the Impact Litigation/Client Service Debate, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
493, 493–94 (1996) (asserting that client service work is viewed by commentators as apolitical and
advocating for a different view of family cases involving domestic violence). That said, although
progressive lawyers have disagreed about priorities and methods for poverty law practice, sometimes
strongly, the existence of some relationship between individual legal needs and social change goals is
generally not disputed. See MARTHA DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1960–1973 at 33 (1993) (discussing different approaches to casework among early poverty
law practitioners). For a recent application of the principle that client service work is a conduit to legal
reform and social change, see Leonore Carpenter, Getting Queer Priorities Straight: How Direct Legal
Services Can Democratize Issue Prioritization in the LGBT Rights Movement, 17 U. PA. J.L. & SOC.
CHANGE 108 (2014). But see Smith, Poverty Warriors, supra note 3 (asserting that resolution of
“individual demands for personal service, either singly or in the aggregate, has no necessary correlation
whatsoever to the causes or conditions of poverty”).
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state-initiated, cases.26 Moreover, the proactive and interventionist role of the
court in family cases suggests that the concept of “private party cases” as distinct
from those initiated by the state is misleading. Family courts have abandoned the
latent role associated with civil courts to take a more active role in case
management and fact-finding, with continued detrimental results.27 Therefore,
the function of access to justice interventions in these cases, as well those cases
more traditionally recognized as involving imbalances of power (such as those
involving the state against an individual, or a landlord against a tenant), should
include not merely creating access, but challenging or otherwise mitigating
against the subordinating aspects of state power. In this context, this article also
raises the overarching question: how do access to justice activists, and court
reformers more generally, protect against the coercive and subordinating
potential of state intervention while facilitating protective and supportive state
functions accessed through courts?28 Although fully resolving this question is
beyond this article’s scope, I provide a framework for access to justice
interventions that can be adapted to different court contexts in order to mitigate,
challenge, and potentially transform the subordinating aspects of state action in
poor people’s courts. Put another way, I provide a framework for access to justice
as a counter-hegemonic practice.
C. Hegemony
The concept of hegemony describes how the control of a social group is
achieved not only by “domination,” or physical force, but also through the
consent of those who are dominated.29 As part of the function of hegemony,
dissent is subdued or co-opted as the dominant group’s perspective is dissemi-
nated through social institutions and popular culture, and internalized as common
sense or “just the way things are.”30 In this view, the legal system helps to
26. Cf. Naomi R. Cahn & June Carbone, The Triple System of Family Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 113
(2013) (arguing that there is a separate system of family law for families who are neither elites, and thus
best able to privately order their families, nor on welfare, and therefore are most vulnerable to
state-initiated action).
27. See L.B. Day, The Development of the Family Court, 136 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
105, 108 (1928) (describing the traditional civil court’s powers as “latent and only called into action by
the efforts of the parties in the case”).
28. See infra Part I (discussing the paradoxes of problem-solving courts).
29. This understanding of hegemony was developed by Antonio Gramsci. See SELECTIONS FROM THE
PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI 12, 161, 170, 416–17 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell
Smith eds., 1971); see also Douglas Litowitz, Gramsci, Hegemony, and the Law, 2000 B.Y.U. L. REV.
515, 115–16 (2000); Duncan Kennedy, Antonio Gramsci and the Legal System, 6 ALSA F. 32, 32 (1982).
30. Litowitz, supra note 29, at 519; see also Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking
Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369, 374, n.11
(1982–1983) (describing “Gramsci’s main contribution to Marxist thought [as showing] how dominant
groups maintain their social position through the creation of ideologies that have sufficient appeal to win
over important segments of the lower and middle classes”); see also CARL BOGGS, GRAMSCI’S MARXISM
39 (1976) (noting, “as all ruling elites seek to perpetuate their power, wealth, and status, they necessarily
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maintain hegemony by legitimizing the social order in two ways: first, by
channeling individual conflicts into public settings that are “laden with ritual and
authoritarian symbolism,” such as courts, that isolate legal “cases” from social
context; and second, through legal reasoning itself, which presupposes the
legitimacy of existing hierarchical power relations.31 In this context, hegemony
can absorb conflict (e.g., about housing rights, or the rights of employees or
family members) but reinforce the underlying power structure (e.g., by legitimiz-
ing property ownership, capitalism, and white heteropatriarchy).32 Modern
scholars note that hegemony does not require ideological consensus.33 Moreover,
hegemony can be challenged or disrupted through counter-hegemonic practices
and the development of counter-hegemonic consciousness.34 Therefore, progres-
sive advocacy strategies typically incorporate methods for developing client
consciousness, such as through client empowerment and organizing.35 Progres-
sive legal scholars have also recognized the counter-hegemonic potential of
attempt to popularize their own philosophy, culture, morality, etc. and render them unchallengeable, part
of the natural order of things”). Hegemony also operates to instill a sense of inferiority or inefficacy in
subordinated groups in order to squelch dissent. See James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom,
106 YALE L.J. 941, 950 (1997) (describing the operation of hegemonic thought: “A might exercise power
over B not only by excluding her grievances from the public agenda, but also by preventing her from
recognizing them as remediable problems, or even by convincing her that she is not the kind of person
who is capable of defining and acting on grievances”); Gabel & Harris, supra, at 371 (describing how
“alienation and powerlessness become a self-generating source of social repression that leads to the
reproduction of class, race and sex hierarchies from generation to generation”).
31. Gabel & Harris, supra note 30, at 373–74; see also infra Part II (detailing the hegemonic nature of
poor people’s courts).
32. Gabel & Harris, supra note 30, at 373–74; see also Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Law on the Street:
Legal Narrative and the Street Law Classroom, 9 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 285, 301 (2007–2008)
[hereinafter MacDowell, Law on the Street] (describing how anti-discrimination law is divorced from
lived realities of racism and thus, cannot address the problem); Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62
MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) (reprinted in MARXISM AND LAW 210–335 (Piers Beirne & Richard Quinney
eds., 1982)) (arguing that antidiscrimination law offers a credible measure of progress without disrupting
the class structure of American society); Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: from 1954 to 1989:
Uncertainty, Contradiction, Rationalization, Denial, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
285–311 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (same). See also infra Part II (discussing how poor people’s
courts allow for contestation of superficial disputes but not underlying norms).
33. See Michael Grossberg, How to Tell Law Stories, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 459, 467 (1998)
(discussing evolving concepts of hegemony in modern scholarship); BOGGS, supra note 30 (defining
hegemony as an “‘organizing principle,’ or world-view (or combination of . . . world-views),” rather than
a monolithic ideological construct).
34. See Gabel & Harris, supra note 30, at 374; see also MacDowell, Law on the Street, supra note 32,
at 325–32 (describing opportunities for the development of counter-hegemonic consciousness); PATRICIA
EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 234–44 (1998)
[hereinafter EWICK & SILBEY, COMMON PLACE OF LAW] (describing the condition of counter-hegemonic
consciousness); Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: Toward a
Sociology of Narrative, 29 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 197, 220–22 (1995) [hereinafter Ewick & Silbey,
Subversive Stories] (same).
35. See Gabel & Harris, supra note 30, at 374; Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from
Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 699, 763 [hereinafter White, To Learn and
Teach]; see also infra Part III (describing counter-hegemonic qualities of social justice advocacy).
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access to justice interventions like self-help.36 This article incorporates the
insights of social justice advocacy into a framework for systematically implement-
ing counter-hegemonic goals in access to justice work within poor people’s
courts.37 In so doing, this article better connects social justice advocacy traditions
to access to justice work.
This is an important time to be reimagining access to justice. It has been more
than fifty years since the Johnson administration launched the War on Poverty38
and the development of law practice models that sought to eradicate poverty and
structural inequality.39 Today, in the wake of the Great Recession and massive
reductions in welfare, more people are living in poverty than at any time in the
last fifty years.40 Moreover, not only are more Americans facing the deprivations
of poverty, they are also facing an ever-more punitive state. Rates of incarcera-
tion and criminalization are astronomical, and the devastating impacts of
hyper-criminalization in communities of color are well documented.41 But
criminalization is only the tip of the iceberg: the erosion of distinctions between
civil and criminal legal regimes—including through myriad civil consequences
of criminal convictions,42 and increasing use of criminal sanctions for violations
of civil laws43—has exacted an incalculable toll on the poor. Indeed, rather than a
War on Poverty, scholars and activists have characterized current national policy
36. See, e.g., Gabel & Harris, supra note 30, at 397 (describing “group-forming strategies like the pro
se divorce clinic in which women and/or men can discover their common experience of being imprisoned
within traditional family roles while working together to change their status”).
37. See infra Part IV (setting forth a framework for a new access to justice model).
38. See generally FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS: WHY
THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL 270–72 (1979) (describing the “War on Poverty” declared by Lyndon
Johnson and related legislative enactments).
39. See, e.g., E. Clinton Bamberger, Jr., The Legal Services Program of the Office of Economic
Opportunity, 41 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 847, 852 (1966) (reporting a statement by Clinton Bamberger, the
first director of the Office of Economic Opportunity Office of Legal Services, that legal services attorneys
should work to “defeat the causes and effects of poverty”). See generally, DAVIS, supra note 25, at 16
(detailing the rise and fall of the welfare right movement).
40. See US Poverty Rate Reaching 50-Year High, COMMON DREAMS (Jul. 23, 2012), https://
commondreams.org/headline/2012/07/23-2. The United States Census Bureau reports, “[t]he nation’s
official poverty rate in 2012 was 15.0 percent, which represents 46.5 million people living at or below the
poverty line. This marked the second consecutive year that neither the official poverty rate nor the
number of people in poverty were statistically different from the previous year’s estimates. The 2012
poverty rate was 2.5 percentage points higher than in 2007, the year before the economic downturn.” U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012
(2013), available at http://census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/income_wealth/cb13-165.html.
41. As compellingly detailed by Michelle Alexander, criminal justice policies in the United States
have effectively instituted “the New Jim Crow.” See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM
CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
42. See generally INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT
(Marc Mauer & Meda Cesney-Lind, eds., 2002). See also ALEXANDER, supra note 41, at 137–70
(detailing the collateral consequences of criminal convictions and mass incarceration, including
stigmatization of African American communities).
43. See, e.g., Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty and Support, 25
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 2 (2014); Kaaryn Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of
Low-Income Women, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 101 (2013) [hereinafter Gustafson, Degradation Ceremo-
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as “the criminalization of poverty.”44 Meanwhile, in the face of conservative
opposition and restrictive legislation,45 federally funded legal services to the poor
long ago shifted away from attacking the structural roots of inequality to a more
limited role in providing legal services to individuals.46 Moreover, funding for
individual legal services has been severely limited along with the scope of
permissible services that can be provided—including at the critical nexus
between punitive regulatory systems like family and criminal law.47 Narratives
about the “deserving” and “underserving” poor48 also limit the services provided
by privately funded programs.49 Research indicates that only half of those
nies]; Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643 (2009)
[hereinafter Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty].
44. See, e.g., Kaaryn Gustafson, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
POVERTY (2011); Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, supra note 43; Meghan Clark, American
Scandal & Disgrace: The Criminalization of Poverty, CATH. MORAL THEOLOGY (Aug. 26, 2011),
http://catholicmoraltheology.com/american-scandal-disgrace-the-criminalization-of-poverty; see also Bob-
bie Ibarra, Criminalizing Poverty, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 10, 2013, 9:03 AM), http://huffingtonpost.com/
bobbie-ibarra/criminalizing-poverty_b_2442148.html; Nancy Ehrenreich, Is it Now a Crime to be Poor?,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2009), http://nytimes.com/2009/08/09/opinion/09ehrenreich.html?pagewanted!all&_
r!0; How We Have Criminalized Poverty, TEX. JAIL PROJECT, http://texasjailproject.org/kerness-speech-
how-we-have-criminalizedpoverty/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2015).
45. See REBEKAH DILLER & EMILY SAVNER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, A CALL TO END FEDERAL
RESTRICTIONS ON LEGAL AID FOR THE POOR 3–4 (2009), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/
publication/call-end-federal-restrictions-legal-aid-poor (describing the efforts of conservatives to dis-
mantle the federally funded legal services program); Deborah Cantrell, A Short History of Poverty
Lawyers in the United States, 5 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 11, 29–31 (2003) (describing cutbacks to federally
funded legal aid beginning with the Reagan administration).
46. See Laura Beth Nielsen & Catherine R. Albiston, The Organization of Public Interest Practice:
1975–2004, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1591, 1618 (2006) (reporting that most federally funded public interest law
offices are focused on individual services rather than social change). Some argue, however, that federal
restrictions do not fully account for a drop in federally funded programs aimed at eliminating poverty. See
Smith, Poverty Warriors, supra note 3, at 39 (arguing that such programs moved away from anti-poverty
work prior to federal restrictions for other reasons, and that a few manage to continue social
justice-oriented work in full compliance with federal restrictions); see also Richard L. Abel, Law Without
Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. REV. 474, 577 (1985) (reporting that legal
aid lawyers performed relatively little legal reform work in the 1980s). Smith reports that under new
federal legal services performance standards introduced in 2007, programs are encouraged “to engage in
advocacy that will achieve systemic benefits and create broad legal remedies not only for individual
clients but also for similarly situated low-income persons and indeed for the poor community as a
whole.” Smith, supra note 3, at 39. In addition, non-federally funded programs have also moved away
from poverty-elimination work. Id. But see Nielsen & Albiston, supra note 46, at 1620 (reporting that
privately-funded public interest law offices are freer to pursue social change agendas and more likely to
do so than their federally-funded counterparts).
47. See DILLER & SAVNER, supra note 45, at 5–15 (describing restrictions on practice by legal aid
organizations receiving federal funds). Restrictions include providing any legal services for inmates
related to litigation, even on family law matters. Id. at 12.
48. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: AMERICA’S ENDURING CONFRONTATION WITH
POVERTY 167 (2013) (discussing the role of metaphor in solidifying popular ideas of the undeserving
poor).
49. See Elizabeth L. MacDowell & Ann Cammett, Models of Invisibility: Rendering Domestic and
Other Gendered Violence Visible to Students through Clinical Law Teaching 9 (forthcoming, VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract!2591445 (observing that “most legal aid
providers direct limited resources to those clients who appeal to their funders’ conceptions about the
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seeking assistance from federally funded legal aid programs can be served, and
fewer than one in five low-income individuals get the legal help they need.50 In
this context, a resurgence of imagination about the ways in which low-income
people might use the law to challenge subordination and dismantle hierarchy is
needed now more than ever.
Part I of the article establishes the institutional origins and philosophy of
family court as a “delegalized,” problem-solving institution, creating unique
challenges for access to justice efforts. While the phenomenon of a problem-
solving court is often characterized as a new development, this Part shows the
deep historical connection of family courts to informalism, intervention, and
intersecting state systems of subordination. Part I also explores the intersectional
impacts and paradoxical nature of the problem-solving court paradigm, which
was established both to promote access to justice for the poor through
comprehensive services and simplified procedures and maintain social hege-
mony. This Part shows how these contradictory agendas, facilitated through the
exercise of procedural informality and broad judicial discretion, continue to fuel
problematic state interventions into poor families.
Part II elaborates the ways in which poor people’s courts are implicated in
maintaining hegemony. This Part shows that the problem with poor people’s
courts is not merely that many individuals are unrepresented and need assistance
accessing court services, but that their routine operation recreates existing social
hierarchies. It also assesses the ability of current access to justice interventions
such as Civil Gideon and self-help legal services to illuminate or challenge
subordinating practices in poor people’s courts. Part II finds that both interven-
tions fall short due to the absence of an animating theory of transformative
advocacy. By showing the ways in which current approaches can work to
reinforce hegemony and subordination, this Part begins to define the goals and
objectives of a counter-hegemonic approach to access to justice.
Part III looks to counter-hegemonic conceptions of advocacy found in social
justice lawyering and social justice-based advocacy by non-lawyers, such as
social workers and lay advocates for abuse survivors. A closer look at the
operation of social justice advocacy models reveals a plurality of advocacies that
can inform access to justice theory and practice. This Part proposes an expanded
conception of counter-hegemonic, social justice advocacy for access to justice
work that focuses on transforming systems through empowerment, mobilization,
and democratization.
Part IV proposes a new framework for access to justice that draws on the
deserving poor”). As the authors note, “[t]hese conceptions function . . . to exclude some individuals
from receiving needed legal assistance, and shape what types of cases legal aid organizations choose to
handle.” Id.
50. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL
NEEDS OF LOW INCOME AMERICANS 2–3 (2009), available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/
pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf.
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principles, goals, and methodologies of social justice advocacy as developed in
Part III. This Part delineates potential components of the new model, including
collaboration between lawyers and other advocates to provide more comprehen-
sive and holistic services; structural relationships between access to justice
programs, courts, and communities designed to promote independence and
accountability; and strategies concerning comprehensiveness of services and
issue prioritization within a counter-hegemonic framework.
Finally, the article concludes by discussing additional work that may be
necessary to fully implement the model, what can be done now in existing
programs in order to make a positive difference, and the opportunities that this
new approach affords for deeper social change.
I. FAMILY COURT REGULATION OF THE POOR IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. Delegalized Courts and Expansion of the State
Legal scholars began taking notice of interventionist and informal procedures
in family courts beginning in the 1960s, as the use of child custody evaluations
and mandatory mediation increased in middle-class divorce cases.51 However,
the use of non-legal professionals in family matters has a long history,
particularly in cases involving low-income families. Family courts emerged at
the turn of the twentieth century, built on the ideals and philosophy of their
immediate predecessor, the juvenile courts.52 Like the juvenile courts, family
courts were premised on the idea that intra-family problems are not primarily
legal in nature, but are instead manifestations of psychological, medical, and
social problems, and best addressed by a multidisciplinary, therapeutic ap-
proach.53 Therefore, reformers believed families in distress required alternatives
51. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 22.
52. See Paul Alexander, Legal Science and the Social Sciences: The Family Court, 21 MO. L. REV.
105, 106 (1956) (“The family court also strives to wed the legal and social sciences. It lifts bodily the
main features of the philosophy, methodology and procedure of the juvenile court and adapts them to the
family court.”). See also Levy, supra note 22, at 120–28 (detailing the parallels between Progressive era
divorce and family court reform advocates and the “child savers” associated with the juvenile court
movement).
53. See, e.g., SAMUEL HOWARD PATTERSON, FAMILY DESERTION AND NON-SUPPORT, A STUDY OF COURT
CASES IN PHILADELPHIA FROM 1916 TO 1920 at 249–50 (1922), available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/pst.
000057640518 (“Sociologists are talking less about the so-called criminal types and more about the
effects of the social environment. Except for those with a degenerate or psychopathic heredity the
majority of criminals are made and not born.”); WALTER GELLHORN & JACOB D. HYMAN, CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY: A REPORT BY A SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND A STUDY BY WALTER GELLHORN, ASSISTED BY JACOB D. HYMAN
AND SIDNEY H. ASCH, ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF LAWS RELATING TO THE FAMILY IN NEW YORK CITY 6
(1954) (“Modern thinking demands that a proper disposition of many [family court] cases requires the
discovery of the root cause and an effort to eradicate it rather than merely treating the symptom by
punitive or purely legal remedies. Such an approach brings our jurisprudence in harmony with up-to-date
sociological and therapeutic knowledge.”). See also Louise Stevens Bryant, A Department of Diagnosis
and Treatment for a Municipal Court, 4 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 198 (1918) (concluding from
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to traditional legal solutions—and the adversary system in particular;54 solutions
that could best be provided by a properly staffed and trained family court team,55
led by a specialist judge.56 This ideal family court was envisioned as “integrated”
or “unified,” with jurisdiction over both civil and criminal matters related to
distress in the family, including delinquency and child-welfare matters, paternity,
child custody and family support (both within and outside the context of marital
dissolution), and divorce and property division.57
her “study of apparent causal factors of domestic difficulties in nearly six thousand cases . . . [in the]
Domestic Relations Division of the Philadelphia Municipal Court . . . that the issues are overwhelmingly
dependent upon medical and psychological interpretations). For a discussion of the juvenile court
movement philosophy of “socialized” courts, see FREDERICK L. FAUST & PAUL J. BRANTINGHAM, JUVENILE
JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY 145–49 (1974). For an accounting of the “child savers” movement for juvenile
courts, see generally BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT
(1999); PLATT, supra note 24, at 6. See also Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75
MINN. L. REV. 691, 694–95 (1991) (discussing the “child-savers” view of juvenile courts); Butler, supra
note 24, at 1341–56 (discussing the role of black women’s clubs in the “child savers” movement); Robin
Walker Sterling, Fundamental Unfairness: In re Gault and the Road Not Taken, 72 MD. L. REV. 607,
615–33 (2013) (regarding the child savers’ philosophy).
54. Reformers opined that problems relating to the breakdown of the family “are usually best treated
with a preventative approach and should ordinarily not be dealt with as purely adversarial proceedings or
in the light of purely legal considerations.” GELLHORN & HYMAN, supra note 53. See also Alexander,
supra note 52, at 107 (“The traditional adversary procedures of the law when employed to resolve
intra-familial conflicts then to fan the flames and intensify antagonism between and among members of
the family; therefore such procedures should be displaced as far as possible by the non-adversary or
conference type of procedure in both determining issues and prescribing remedies . . . . ”). Hostility to
formalism was a part of a larger Progressive agenda that advocated for the “socialization” of the law. See
Roscoe Pound, Social Problems and the Courts, 18 AM. J. OF SOC. 331, 340–41 (1912) (discussing the
socialization of law and courts as part of a modern trend).
55. Court staffs should include “probation officers, investigators, case workers, psychiatrists.”
Alexander, supra note 52, at 108–09 (quoting from, REPORT FROM THE A.B.A DELEGATION TO THE NAT’L
CONFERENCE ON FAMILY LIFE; the conference was held in Washington, D.C. in September 1948). See also
GELLHORN & HYMAN, supra note 53, at 6–7 (“[T]o perform their functions with any degree of adequacy,
[family] courts . . . should be appropriately equipped with diagnostic and treatment facilities. Such
facilities should include trained social case workers, medical, clinic psychiatric and psychological
services, and marital and religious counseling services.”).
56. See Alexander, supra note 52, at 106–07.
57. GELLHORN & HYMAN, supra note 53, at 13 (calling for an “integrated” court); REGINALD HEBER
SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE PRESENT DENIAL OF JUSTICE TO THE POOR AND OF THE
AGENCIES MAKING MORE EQUAL THEIR POSITION BEFORE THE LAW WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO LEGAL
AID WORK IN THE UNITED STATES 74 (1919) (reporting consensus for “unification of jurisdiction and
specialization by judges”). Gellhorn and Hyman note the existence of “almost unanimous agreement on
the undesirability of the present fragmentation of jurisdiction over these different [family-related]
problems between so many unrelated courts.” GELLHORN & HYMAN, supra note 53, at 7. Cincinnati has
been credited with establishing the first consolidated family court in 1914. See WILLIAM J. BLACKBURN,
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO (1935); Alexander, supra note 52, at 106.
However, a domestic relations court was established in Buffalo in 1910, hearing nonsupport and other
family matters such as offenses against minors and custody matters. See MANUAL FOR PROBATION
OFFICERS IN NEW YORK STATE VOL. 2 at 249 (2d Ed. Rev. 1918) (on file with author); see also Christine B.
Harrington, Delegalization Reform Movements: A Historical Analysis, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL
JUSTICE, VOL. I, THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (Richard L. Abel, ed., 1982) (“Domestic Relations courts
adopted the juvenile court philosophy of social justice and applied it to cases of wife abandonment,
illegitimacy, failure to support, offenses against minors, and custody disputes.”). This article refers to
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While widespread implementation of these ideals was slow and uneven, and
today there remain many variations among family courts in terms of organization
and administration,58 there nonetheless exists a shared institutional history and
culture among family courts. This includes a common origin and philosophy that
manifest in three interrelated features: interventionism (e.g., use of social
workers and medical and mental health professionals to conduct evaluations of
litigants), informalism (e.g., simplification of procedures and forms, and efforts
to resolve disputes outside of the litigation process), and intersecting systems,
including the enduring interrelationship of criminal and civil procedures in
family courts.59 Together, these constitute what I refer to as delegalization. As it
did in the juvenile courts, delegalization operated in family courts to expand the
operation of the state in ways that are difficult to control or contain, and that have
often had coercive and disparate impacts along intersecting racial, ethnic, gender,
and class lines.60 The impulse toward delegalization eroded distinctions between
legal and non-legal professions and processes and between civil and criminal law,
with the effect of both widening and obscuring the boundaries of state action.
In particular, the emphasis on psychosocial and environmental factors in
family problems justified an expanded role for the state in addressing family
dysfunction, or what has been termed “the ‘interventionist’ style.”61 Court
reformers adopted the language of diagnosis and prevention, while court staffs
with non-legal expertise were tasked with investigating family conditions,
diagnosing family pathologies, and prescribing solutions.62 As in the juvenile
courts before them, this provided family courts with new resources and linked
courts to social agencies.63 The family court also became a location for the
intersection of civil and criminal systems, as authority for this expanded
incursion into the family was initially accomplished in part through criminaliza-
tion of some intra-family disputes—namely, family desertion and nonsupport
cases.64
these and other specialized courts hearing multiple types of family law matters as “family courts,”
regardless of their official designation or extent of integration.
58. See Barbara A. Babb, Reevaluating Where We Stand: A Comprehensive Survey of America’s
Family Justice Systems, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 230 (2008) (summarizing jurisdictions with a family court).
Babb finds, in 2006, “thirty-eight states had either statewide family courts, family courts in selected areas
of the state, or pilot or planned family courts, representing seventy-five percent of states. The number of
states without a specialized or separate system to handle family law matters decreased from seventeen
states in 1998 to thirteen states in 2006.” Id. at 231.
59. See infra Part I (describing key features of interventionism, informality and intersecting systems
within the family court).
60. See infra Part I (describing the intersectional impacts of the family court).
61. Levy, supra note 22, at 718.
62. See Willard J. Hurst, Changing Popular Views about Law and Lawyers, 287 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 1 (1953).
63. Harrington, supra note 57, at 51.
64. See SMITH, supra note 57, at 75.
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1. Intervention and Intersecting Systems
Originally civil issues, desertion and nonsupport were criminalized through a
series of statutes, including the American Uniform Desertion Act of 1910.65
Reformers justified use of the criminal law on the basis of the state’s interest in
regulating the family.66 This interest was newly fueled by concerns about the
relationship between crime and family dysfunction on the one hand,67 and the
longstanding desire to avoid state responsibility for family poverty on the other.68
The coercive power of the criminal law could be used to enforce personal
responsibility and compliance with support obligations for poor families;
probation staff along with other court staff members could be used to investigate
cases and assist the court in determining facts.69 However, as some formerly civil
family law matters were criminalized, criminal processes underwent delegaliza-
tion, and these processes were in turn applied to civil family matters.
As leading Progressive-era legal reformer Reginald Herbert Walker Smith
described:
65. See id. See also NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS, AMERICAN UNIFORM DESERTION ACT: BEING THE
DRAFT OF AN ACT RELATING TO DESERTION AND NON-SUPPORT OF WIFE BY HUSBAND, OR OF CHILDREN BY
EITHER FATHER OR MOTHER, AND PROVING PUNISHMENT THEREFORE, AND TO PROMOTE UNIFORMITY
BETWEEN THE STATES IN REFERENCE THERETO—NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS (1910), available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044053412987. In New York City,
actions to compel the support of a family remained under the jurisdiction of the criminal court until 1933.
After that, support cases outside of the context of a matrimonial action were conducted in Family Court,
which was part of the new Domestic Relations court. The new court could enforce financial support of a
spouse, children born of a marriage, or a poor relative. GELLHORN & HYMAN, supra note 53, at 158.
However, the Family Court retained a criminal jurisdiction under the Domestic Relations Court Act,
which made non-support a crime punishable by up to twelve months in jail. Id. at n.1. Nonsupport of
children is still a crime in all fifty states, and nonsupport of spouses is a crime in many states, with
varying classifications and penalties. See Criminal Nonsupport 50 State Table, NAT’L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://ncsl.org/research/human-services/criminal-nonsupport-and-child-support.aspx (last
visited Mar. 8, 2015).
66. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 57, at 75 (describing criminalization of family matters as “entirely
logical because the law has always claimed that the state has a direct interest in all marital and family
questions, and that the best way to enforce that interest in fact is through criminal proceedings to which
the state is a party and over which it can keep a much closer watch”).
67. See Charles Zunser, The Domestic Relations Courts, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Mar.
1926, at 114–15 (claiming children become delinquent due to abandonment by their fathers and citing
studies).
68. See, e.g., id. at 115 (describing costs of desertion as including the financial burden of caring for
children and women deserted by male breadwinners in public orphanages); PATTERSON, supra note 53, at
252 (observing that, loathe to extend widows pensions to deserted and unmarried mothers, “[t]he theory
upon which society is going is to compel the deserting husband either to return or to contribute to the
support of the family”). See also ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 24, at 26–27 (pointing out that
these justifications for differential intrusion on poor families date back to the “Elizabethan Poor Law”).
69. Gellhorn and Hyman describe a twofold theory of the law underlying the family court: first, the
court is “aimed at enforcing individual responsibility”; second, it treats nonsupport as a symptom of a
larger problem related to family breakdown. GELLHORN & HYMAN, supra note 53, at 163. The latter
underlies provisions for home visits and investigation, in order to provide the court with “[a]n accurate
and objective report in writing giving the facts thus obtained [to become] part of the case history.” Id.
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[T]he domestic relations courts [like the juvenile courts] are rapidly eliminating
the traditional forbidding aspects of a criminal trial by informality of
procedure, by using the summons instead of the arrest, by having the attending
officers in plain clothes, and by having the parties sit around a table with the
judge instead of standing in cages or behind bars, nevertheless the machinery of
the criminal law is more and more being used.70
Smith points to the “steady drift” of incorporating civil matters like divorce,
spousal support, and child custody into courts handling desertion, abandonment,
and non-support, and other civil matters like illegitimacy, “and further the
tendency of such courts, wherever they have acquired civil jurisdiction, to apply
to the civil matters the same processes as those originally developed through the
summary criminal remedies.”71 To the extent court jurisdiction over matrimonial
matters remained separate, reformers pointed to the implementation of interven-
tionist measures in domestic relations and juvenile courts as reason to expand
their use in custody actions incident to divorce.72 Moreover, the impetus for these
reforms was to facilitate judicial fact-finding, not solely or primarily for child
protection, as some scholars have argued.73
2. Informalism and Intervention
Progressive-era court reformers did not, for the most part, adopt the child
savers’ child-protectionist rationales for intervention in family cases. This is not
to say that reformers did not consider the intersection of judicial decision-making
and children’s interests, but that the focus was on what sorts of facts were
relevant to such an inquiry and what sorts of assistance was needed for resolving
custody issues.74 Reformers argued that adversarial processes were inadequate
70. SMITH, supra note 57, at 75. As Harrington observes, “[t]he summons, however, was backed up by
the coercive power of a bench warrant if the defendant did not show up. It appears that ‘decriminaliza-
tion’ represented little more than the use of less overtly coercive incentives to ensure compliance.”
Harrington, supra note 57, at 52 n.14.
71. SMITH, supra note 57, at 81–82 (noting courts in Detroit, Philadelphia, and Cincinnati were
investigating divorce cases using probation staff, or sought to do so).
72. See GELLHORN & HYMAN, supra note 53, at 310. See also Ross v. Ross, 143 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1955)
(expressing frustration that the Supreme Court is denied adjunct clinical staff and the authority to appoint
a skilled liaison to ensure its orders are followed); William M. Wherry, But do the Children Get Justice?,
9 B. BULLETIN 17–21 (Nov. 1951) (New York County Lawyers Assoc.) (comparing case processing
methods in the New York Supreme Court and the Domestic Relations Court, and arguing that it would
help eliminate juvenile delinquency to apply the non-adversarial methods of the Children’s Court to
custody matters in the Supreme Court). Civil courts also sought to extend summary criminal procedures
used in domestic relations matters to enforcement of orders in divorce and separation cases. See SMITH,
supra note 57, at 82.
73. See Levy, supra note 22, at 719–21 (arguing that Progressive-era family-court reformers like
Gellhorn emphasized children’s rights in divorce reform efforts).
74. See GELLHORN & HYMAN, supra note 53, at 315–16 (noting that judges may be asked to make
determinations outside their expertise, such as how parental health impacts their child’s well-being). See
also Wherry, supra note 72, at 17–21 (arguing that outcomes for children in courts using social workers
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for the proper resolution of custody disputes, which they believed required “a
determination of personality and emotional attitudes as they affect relationships
between the parents and children.”75 Rather than child protection, family court
reformers were motivated by rejection of legalistic approaches to solving
problems viewed as social in nature, a belief in social science, and a desire to
rationalize court organization and administration.76 As with the juvenile court
reform movement, however, claims about the social nature of the issues involved
and the non-legal expertise necessary for their resolution quickly led to an
expanded, interventionist role for courts to handle other family matters.77
The reliance on simplified procedures and non-legal processes and interven-
tions was not only a reflection of the ideology of the new family courts; it was a
method for managing burgeoning court dockets and expanded judicial authority
under the new family court regime.78 Reformers pointed to the burgeoning
populations of immigrants and the working class, and the explosion of urban
centers, as causing a breakdown in judicial administration.79 Simplified forms
and assistance from probation officers and social workers facilitated processing
cases in delegalized family courts by gathering information needed by the judge
in a court that prioritized “social” information. For example, Smith reports that in
Cincinnati:
[E]very divorce case is thoroughly investigated and reported on to the Court
before the parties put on their evidence. The report blanks require, in addition to
the facts of the dispute, a complete personal history, including such matters as
church membership, moral character, temperance, mentality, occupation, a
statement as to the character of the home, its sanitation, cleanliness, and order,
and detailed figures as to the earnings and joint holdings of the parties.80
Additionally, conciliation was used in both civil and criminal cases in response to
reformers’ anxiety about the social costs of marital breakups. Referring to
desertion and nonsupport cases, Smith notes that:
and psychiatric services are superior to outcomes in courts using traditional legal methods). A greater
focus on the children, however, was an inevitable result of prioritizing social over individual interests.
See Pound, supra note 54, at 338 (“The individual interests of parents which used to be the one thing
regarded has come to be almost the last thing regarded as compared with the interest of the child and the
interest of society. In other words, here also social interests are now chiefly regarded.”).
75. GELLHORN & HYMAN, supra note 53, at 310.
76. See Harrington, supra note 57, at 63 (referring to the latter as an “administrative-technocratic
rationale” for judicial interventionism).
77. See, e.g., Ross, 143 N.Y.S.2d at 234.
78. See Harrington, supra note 57, at 52 (describing the domestic relations courts as “represent[ing]
the institutionalization of informal dispute processing”).
79. SMITH, supra note 57, at 6–7.
80. Id. at 82.
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[C]ourts have . . . more and more employed the method of conciliation. The
interest of the state in these cases is that homes should not be broken up except
for grave causes and that families should be reunited whenever possible . . . . A
conciliation proceeding gives the court its only chance to repair, reunite, and
construct.81
Thus, conciliation simultaneously expanded the reach of the court into litigants’
personal lives and facilitated processing cases in over-burdened courts.82
Reformers acknowledged the tension between informal interventions and
adversary processes, and generally affirmed that the latter should remain
available for “any person demanding it for the finding of disputed fact.”83 At the
same time, they pushed for new rules to facilitate the expansion of informal
interventions, including relaxing evidentiary standards,84 and expanded judicial
discretion.85 Importantly, court reformers viewed informal processes and state
interventions as providing access to justice for the poor as well as benefiting the
state.86
B. The Paradox of the Problem Solving Court
For reformers like Smith, administrative work done by courts in the state’s
interest—from investigation to enforcement—resulted in a corresponding de-
crease in the denial of justice to the individual.87 This rationale for delegalization
informed the development of not only family courts, but courts assigned to hear
81. Id. at 80.
82. See Harrington, supra note 57, at 53 (observing “[t]he flexibility of conciliation procedures
facilitated social investigation into family problems”). See also Edgar J. Lauer, Conciliation—A Cure for
the Law’s Delay, 136 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 54 (1928); Edgar J. Lauer, Conciliation, A
Cure for Congested Court Calendars, 27 N. Y. LEGAL AID REV. 1 (1929). The interventionist nature of
conciliation was exacerbated by how courts implemented it: all court staff members, from courts to
bailiffs to judges, were encouraged to attempt conciliation at every opportunity. Harrington, supra note
57, at 54.
83. Alexander, supra note 52, at 107. See also GELLHORN & HYMAN, supra note 53, at 6 (opining that
problems relating to the breakdown of the family “involve important sociological consequences affecting
the community at large. Such matters . . . are usually best treated with a preventative approach and should
ordinarily not be dealt with as purely adversarial proceedings or in the light of purely legal
considerations. This does not mean that the traditional protections of the judicial process should be
lessened in any degree in determining legal rights.”).
84. See GELLHORN & HYMAN, supra note 53, at 332–33.
85. See, e.g., Zunser, supra note 67, at 124 (calling for family courts to be granted equity powers, so
judges could maintain jurisdiction over parties and ensure compliance with their orders). For a discussion
of the rise of judicial discretion in family law cases beginning in the nineteenth century, see generally
MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
(1985) [hereinafter GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH].
86. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 57, at 76 (“Desertion and refusal to support wives and children are
made crimes in order to protect the state’s interest in the family, but this change automatically worked a
great improvement in the position of the poor before the law because it made available the processes of
the criminal law.”).
87. Id. at 82.
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other “low level” disputes, such as small claims and landlord–tenant matters,
during the Progressive era.88 Simplified procedures and court investigation made
the court accessible to the poor because it reduced the need for lawyers;89 use of
the coercive tools of the criminal court put the onus of enforcement on the state,
rather than the litigant.90 Unifying courts so that related or similar matters could
be heard by one judge or set of judges would both increase efficiency and make
the courts more accessible.91 Reformers’ belief that fairness in administrating
justice was necessary in order to socialize and democratize new populations of
urban poor and the working class lent urgency to their claims.92 While the new
courts undoubtedly assisted some low-income individuals who sought help,93
assistance from the new courts also came with hazards for the poor and
working-class people—primarily minorities and women—whom the courts
aimed to help; harmful effects that remain obscured by the rhetoric of access to
justice.
1. Subordinating Impacts of the New Family Courts
The impacts of the new family court were shaped by the intersection of race
88. See Bezdek, supra note 6, at 535 (“Courts assigned to hear small claims were designed with the
expectation that citizens would speak directly to courts without the aid or obstacle of formal rules of
evidence, professionally trained representatives, or elaborate rules of entitlement or presentation.”). See
also SMITH, supra note 59, at 41–59 (discussing small claims courts). These rationales continue to fuel
calls for informalized, problem-solving courts. See Tal Finney & Joel Yanovich, Expanding Social
Justice Through the “People’s Court”, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 769 (2006); Suzanne E. Elwell &
Christopher D. Carlson, The Iowa Small Claims Court: An Empirical Analysis, 75 IOWA L. REV. 433
(1990); Catherine J. Ross, The Failure of Fragmentation: The Promise of a System of Unified Family
Courts, 32 FAM. L.Q. 3 (1998).
89. See SMITH, supra note 57, at 78 (describing how simplified procedures and forms in family court
have “eliminate[d] the attorney’s function insofar as it is dispensable”).
90. Id. at 79.
91. See GELLHORN & HYMAN, supra note 53, at 9 (arguing against the inefficiency of maintaining
multiple courts with separate jurisdiction over overlapping family matters).
92. In the introduction to Smith’s report, Justice and the Poor, Henry S. Pritchett, then-President of
the Carnegie Foundation (which funded the report), writes: “For no group in the citizenship of this
country is [a fair administration of justice] more needed than in the case of the great mass of citizens of
foreign birth, ignorant of the language, and helpless to secure their rights unless met by an administration
of the machinery of justice that shall be simple, sympathetic, and patient. To such, the apparent denial of
justice forms the path to disloyalty and bitterness.” SMITH, supra note 57, at xi–xii (emphasis added). See
also id. at ix (then-Senator of New York Elihu Root opining in the foreword, “[Smith’s report] should be
of great value to the multitude of Americans who are interested in the Americanization of the millions of
foreigners who have immigrated to this country, and who fail to understand or who misunderstand
American institutions”). Smith underscores the concern that the failure to prioritize Americanization will
lead to political instability. See id. at 6 (warning that “[t]he inhabitants of the American colonies learned
from the tyrannies and arbitrary conduct of George III and the Royal Governors what denial of justice
meant, and it incited them to rebellion”). In keeping with this framing of the need for court reform,
“Americanization rather than class injustice became the central focus when the American Bar Association
considered Smith’s report.” DAVIS, supra note 25, at 16.
93. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 57, at 80 (reporting amounts of support collected by domestic relations
courts in Chicago, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Detroit, and Boston, from 1911 to 1916).
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and ethnicity, class and gender, and geography.94 First, criminalization of family
law matters like desertion and nonsupport meant that low-income women could
rely on state resources to secure support from absent husbands and fathers.95
However, it also meant that poor women and their families were forced into the
criminal justice system for help with family economic troubles.96 This was in
contrast to wealthier families who had better recourse to divorce, which often
required payment of a lawyer and court fees.97 The impacts of expanding
criminal penalties in the delegalized court were significant. For example, in 1923,
68.4% of all persons on probation in all magistrate courts in New York City were
“non-supporters.”98 The pervasiveness of the problem gave rise to use of the
term, “poor man’s divorce” for desertion cases.99 The impact of criminalization
was hardest on urban lower-working class families, and black families in
particular.100 For example, a study of nonsupport cases in Philadelphia from 1916
to 1920 found that black husbands were represented at rates that were double
their presence in the city’s general adult population.101
Second, the broad discretion afforded to the court staff responsible for
investigating family court cases facilitated the imposition of white middle-class
values and stereotypes on low-income families, especially low-income immi-
grant and black mothers.102 The institutionalization of discretionary decision-
94. See Kimberle´ Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
139, 140 (1989) (setting forth the theory of intersectionality to describe the multidimentional experiences
of black women); Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Theorizing from Particularity: Perpetrators and Intersec-
tional Theory on Domestic Violence, 16 J. GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE 531 (2013) [hereinafter MacDowell,
Theorizing from Particularity] (advocating for a broad approach to intersectionality that analyzes the
multidimentional experiences of men and white women and issues of relative subordination).
95. See SMITH, supra note 57, at 76–80 (describing criminal as opposed to civil processes for securing
a support order).
96. See Zunser, supra note 67, at 118 (noting that the state required a complaint of nonsupport be
brought by an individual in order to proceed with a nonsupport case).
97. See SMITH, supra note 57, at 20–30 (discussing court fees and court costs as barriers to access to
justice for the poor). Access to the courts for divorce was not deemed a constitutional right until 1971. See
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 371 (1971) (holding state court’s failure to waive filing fees for
indigents seeking divorce was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
98. That same year, the courts collected a total of $2,322,588.91 from them for their families. Zunser,
supra note 67, at 118.
99. See PATTERSON, supra note 53, at 252 (“Broken family life in the so-called upper social classes
frequently results in divorce. In the so-called lower economic classes it takes the more simple form of
desertion. Indeed, desertion has been called ‘the poor man’s divorce.’”).
100. See id. at 269–72 (discussing representation of black and foreign-born men in desertion and
nonsupport cases); id. at 279–80 (providing data showing lower-working class black husbands were
disproportionally represented in desertion and nonsupport cases).
101. Id. at 271. Immigrant husbands were prominently, but not disproportionally, represented in cases
during the same period. Id. at 272.
102. See Butler, supra note 24, at 1358–61 (discussing operation of white middle class norms in the
juvenile justice system during this era); ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 24, at 59 (“Studies of
child protection decision making show that caseworkers tend to use a model family as a frame of
reference. They evaluate problem behavior by the extent it deviates from this parenting ideal. The model
for many caseworkers is a white, middle-class family composed of married parents and their children”);
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making by probation officers, social workers, and other family court staff
complimented doctrinal trends in American family law that had resulted in broad
legal standards for judicial decisions regarding the custody and control of
children.103 The latter trend allowed judges, beginning in the nineteenth century,
to determine parental fitness for custody upon break up of the family and to
enforce gender norms, particularly regarding maternal fitness.104 Working in
conjunction with one another in the new family courts, expansive judicial and
extrajudicial discretion facilitated coercive state interventions in vulnerable
families. Despite the rhetorical shift during the Progressive era toward diagnosis,
treatment, and rehabilitation, eugenics-based theories about the inherent criminal-
ity and socially deviant character of certain groups remained influential.105
Swelling populations of immigrants and black Americans in North American
cities were associated with crime.106 Stereotypes about black men and women as
prone to criminality,107 and black women as morally deficient “Jezebels” and
prostitutes,108 were prevalent. At the same time, the belief in the influence of
environmental factors on behavior only served to reinforce justifications for court
interventions in low-income urban immigrant and black families.109 One result
was an enduring legacy of racism and gender and class bias in juvenile and
child-welfare cases that is reflected in historical accounts of the first family courts
and continues to the present day.110 But these impacts are not only present in
state-initiated cases. The subordinating impacts of expanded discretion and the
imposition of bias, and intersecting punitive state systems, persists in cases where
the state is not a party as well.
see also Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare “Reform,”
Family and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 707 (1998) [hereinafter Murphy, Legal Images of
Motherhood] (“Conversations with [child protective services] workers reveal a deep bias about bad
mothering based on race, class, and poverty”).
103. See GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH, supra note 85, at 234–85 (detailing the judicial
transformation of custody law in the nineteenth century).
104. Id. at 252.
105. See Butler, supra note 24, at 1365–68 (discussing the persistence of eugenics-based theories of
black inferiority in the juvenile court system). Platt refers to the child savers’ “rhetoric of legitimization”
which drew from (sometimes conflicting) multiple sources: “From the medical profession, the child
savers borrowed the imagery of pathology, infection and treatment; from the tenets of Social Darwinism,
they derived their pessimistic views about the intractability of human nature and the innate moral defects
of the working class; finally, their ideas about the biological and environmental origins of crime may be
attributed to the positivist tradition in European criminology and to anti-urban sentiments associated with
the rural, Protestant ethic.” Anthony Platt, The Rise of the Child Saving Movement: A Study in Social
Policy and Correctional Reform, 381 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 21, 22 (1969).
106. See Butler, supra note 24, at 1348.
107. See id. at 1364–65. Even upper-class blacks were unable to escape attribution of these
stereotypes. See id. at 1383.
108. Id. at 1386.
109. Id. at 1362; Harrington, supra note 57, at 51 (noting that reformers viewed juvenile courts as
helping poor and working-class immigrant children become “Americanized,” countering the perceived
negative influence of crowded urban settings).
110. See Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood, supra note 102, at 719 (describing the impacts of
broad prosecutorial discretion in child-welfare cases).
494 [Vol. XXIIThe Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy
2. Present-Day Dynamics
While civil courts do not typically track demographic information regarding
persons using their services, one study of data from court-based services for
unrepresented litigants indicates that, in some courts, the majority of litigants
without counsel in private family cases that identify themselves as racial and
ethnic minorities are women, and are poor.111 Moreover, the use of informal and
interventionist procedures, including use of child custody investigations and in-
formal dispute resolution, has continued to expand throughout the twentieth
century in private party cases.112 There are new professional staff such as
“parenting coordinators,” “early neutral evaluators,” and “family law facilita-
tors”; the courts also continue to vest enormous power in nonprofessional staff
such as clerks, custody investigators, case managers, and, in many cases,
mediators.113
The continued institutionalization of informal fact finding and dispute
resolution means that much decision-making affecting legal rights takes place
largely without reference to legal rights and norms and, in many cases, without a
written record or the possibility of appellate review.114 As in the early courts and
in state-initiated cases, the discretion afforded to non-legal professionals and the
indeterminacy of legal standards also leaves litigants vulnerable to the infiltration
of bias in decision-making.115 While there may be some advantages to less
111. See, e.g., Emily Troshynski & Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Gender, Self-Help, and Access to Justice
6–7 (manuscript on file with author) (reporting demographic findings from meta-analysis of twenty
self-help studies conducted between 2000 and 2010, from a total of ten California counties). Additionally,
most self-represented litigants had not completed college and many were monolingual in a language
other than English. Id. While demographics vary among courts, many jurisdictions report similar
findings. See JOHN M. GREACEN, CTR. FOR FAMS., CHILD. & THE CTS., CA ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS,
SELF REPRESENTED LITIGANTS AND COURT AND LEGAL SERVICES RESPONSES TO THEIR NEEDS: WHAT WE
KNOW 4–8, available at http://courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/SRLwhatweknow.pdf (last visited Mar.
8, 2015).
112. See Murphy, Revitalizing the Adversary System, supra note 21; see also Levy, supra note 22, at
716–17 (describing the increase in court ordered custody investigations in one Minnesota county from
thirty-five investigations in 1956 to a predicted seven hundred investigations in 1985, despite the
emergence of custody mediation, beginning in 1970).
113. See Murphy, Revitalizing the Adversary System, supra note 21, at 901–02.
114. Id. at. 906.
115. It also creates process dangers based on power imbalances between litigants. Regarding
mediation, see generally Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE
L.J. 1545, 1576–77 (1991); Lisa Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of
Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57 (1984); Richard Delgado et al.,
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS.
L. REV. 1359, 1395 (1985). As a result of problems associated with informalism, some poverty law
scholars contend that formal legal processes are the best way to protect low-income litigants. See, e.g.,
Mark H. Lazerson, In the Halls of Justice, the Only Justice is in the Halls, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL
JUSTICE 119 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982); Bezdek, supra note 6; Rebecca E. Zietlow, Two Wrongs Don’t
Add Up to Rights: The Importance of Preserving Due Process in Light of Recent Welfare Reform
Measures, 45 AM. U.L. REV. 1111 (1996). Others, however, suggest that poor people may benefit from
less formal procedures. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare
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formal dispute resolution processes for litigants, the negative impacts of these
practices fall hardest on vulnerable populations without the resources to negotiate
legal remedies under more favorable circumstances.
Several decades of gender and race bias studies show pervasive bias against
litigants in private family law cases, including cases relating to domestic
violence, divorce, custody, and support.116 As summed up by Jeannette Swent in
a comprehensive analysis of task force reports, these studies show that, “Women
receive unfavorable substantive outcomes in cases because of their gender, and
men do not. Women’s complaints are trivialized and their circumstances
misconstrued more often than men’s, and women more often than men are
victims of demeaning and openly hostile behavior in court proceedings.”117
Studies on gender and race bias have, for the most part, been conducted
separately, and without regard to intersecting effects of gender, class, and race
and ethnicity, or, for that matter, sexuality or other social positions.118 However,
“many groups [studying bias] considered poverty and reported that poor
women’s problems with access to justice are acute and are compounded by
gender bias.”119 Further attention to intersectional subordination shows that the
family court system impacts poor people differently and subordinates both poor
men and women, often in gender-specific ways. For example, low-income men
continue to be incarcerated in high rates for child support debt through the family
court under doctrines of civil contempt.120 Although incarceration is supposed to
be limited to cases where the child-support obligor has the current ability to pay
the support owed, judicial disregard of legal standards results in what amounts to
debtors’ prison for some low-income obligors.121 Low-income women and men
of color are still more likely than wealthier individuals to suffer the consequences
System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983); Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for
the Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 861 (1990).
116. See Swent, supra note 11.
117. Id. at 55.
118. Id. at 78–80.
119. Id. at 80.
120. This occurs in child support cases initiated by the state in order to collect on welfare payments
made to a custodial parent or guardian on behalf of a child and in support cases initiated by a custodial
parent or guardian. See Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support Obligor:
The Silent Return of Debtor’s Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB POL’Y 95 (2009). See also Turner v. Rogers,
131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (involving the appeal of an indigent child support obligor incarcerated for
nonpayment of child support debt to the custodial parent). “In South Carolina, where Michael Turner was
incarcerated, child support obligors imprisoned for civil contempt comprise approximately thirteen to
sixteen percent of the jail population.” Tonya Brito, Fathers Behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support
Policy for Non-Custodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 617, 618 (2012). Child
support laws are gender neutral; therefore, while fathers are more likely to be noncustodial parents and
liable for child support, noncustodial mothers may be subject to child support obligations and
enforcement, as well. See id. at 618 n.8 (reporting that “a recent study of child support civil contempt
hearings observed that twelve percent of parent–debtors were mothers”).
121. Patterson observes that, “[t]he majority of [child support] obligors with arrearages, and thus
subject to repeated contempt proceedings, are below the poverty line. The Federal Office of Child
Support Enforcement reports that 70 percent of child support arrearages are owed by noncustodial
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of the ongoing intersection of the family court with the criminal justice system,
including in private party cases.122
In addition to child support enforcement, newer system intersections have
caused increased exposure to punitive sanctions through family court proceed-
ings. For example, civil protection orders, violations of which are a crime in all
states, have become the primary remedy for domestic violence.123 In some states,
violations of these orders, which are typically obtained under relaxed civil
evidentiary standards, have become a routine shortcut to convictions for
additional crimes with greater penalties, such as burglary.124 Protection orders
also come with collateral consequences125 that may impact parties subject to such
orders in ways akin to criminal convictions.126 Potential exposure to the child
welfare system also increases with domestic violence claims, for example,
through court programs utilizing child-welfare caseworkers to investigate
parents with no annual earnings or earnings less than $10,000. Only 4 percent are owed by noncustodial
parents with an annual income of $40,000 or more.” Patterson, supra note 120, at 118.
122. This connection also manifests at the nexus of family law and mass incarceration. See Ann
Cammett, Deadbeats, Deadbrokes, and Prisoners, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 127 (2011)
(detailing how mass incarceration increases poverty linked to child support debt). There is also a trend
toward greater enforcement of child support through the criminal justice system. See Sheila Bapat,
Debtors Prisons are Alive and Well in America, ALTERNET (Jul. 30, 2013), http://alternet.org/economy/
debtors-prisons-are-alive-and-well-america (reporting raids to arrest child support debtors, and mass
issuance of bench orders for nonpayment of support).
123. TK Logan & Robert Walker, Civil Protection Order Outcomes: Violations and Perceptions of
Effectiveness, 24 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 675, 685 (2009); see also Susan Keilitz, Improving Judicial
System Responses to Domestic Violence: The Promises and Risks of Integrated Case Management and
Technology Solutions, in HANDBOOK OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION STRATEGIES 147, 149 (Albert
R. Roberts ed., 2002) (reporting that domestic violence survivors are more likely to seek protection
through civil protection orders than the criminal justice system); Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil
Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the
Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1489 (2008) (characterizing civil protection orders as the
“most commonly used legal remedy for domestic violence”); PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES,
NAT’L INST. JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS
FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY (2000) (reporting that approximately twenty
percent of the 1.5 million survivors of domestic violence obtain civil protection orders annually).
124. JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING
PRIVACY 19–34 (2009). Violation of some protection order provisions is also a deportable offence. See
Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(2)(E)(ii) (2009).
125. See generally, Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda
Chesney-Lind, eds., 2002).
126. See, e.g., Putman v. Kennedy, 900 A.2d 1256, 1261–63 (Conn. 2006) (holding that because there
is a possibility of “significant collateral consequences,” the expiration of the restraining order does not
render the case moot). Collateral consequences include the social stigma associated with being identified
as an abuser. Id. at 1263. Protection orders are accessible in future investigations about the same family
and may be used to make negative inferences about the party subject to the order in future family law
matters. Id. Additionally, employment may be affected by firearm restrictions that some states include on
protective orders. Federal law also prohibits possession of firearms by individuals convicted of domestic
violence or subject to some types of protective orders. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2010).
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domestic violence claims.127 Men and women of color may be particularly
vulnerable to the operation of bias in the protection order process due to
stereotypes about survivors and perceptible perpetrators of crime.128
Finally, the number of family courts with concurrent jurisdiction over both
civil and criminal cases is growing. As in earlier stages of the court reform
movement, present-day reformers seek to increase access to justice by reducing
what they view as unnecessary fragmentation in the court system. In particular,
proponents of integrated courts seek to address problems of overlapping
jurisdiction over family cases involving domestic violence, which often presents
both civil and criminal issues. However, combining civil and criminal courts also
facilitates more punitive state interventions into the family while reducing
procedural protections for defendants and safety concerns for survivors. Notably,
litigants seeking protection orders, and those responding to protection-order
requests, have even higher rates of self-representation than other family cases,
and are thus especially vulnerable to state interventions into their families as a
result of these intersections.129
The institutional roots and consequences of informalism, intervention, and
intersecting state systems illuminate the contours of access to justice work in
family courts: to prepare or protect litigants. But the combined effects of
delegalization also lead to a sum greater than its parts. The harms to low-income
litigants in poor people’s courts potentially include loss of rights,130 limited
autonomy and privacy,131 and deprivation of voice.132 The institutional culture
127. For example, while teaching a domestic violence clinical course in Orange County, California, I
learned that the family court’s Domestic Violence Prevention Services Project sends caseworkers from
the Department of Children and Family Services unannounced to the homes of applicants for protection
orders who are referred to the program. For a discussion of the often punitive impacts of child welfare
systems on domestic violence survivors, see Suzanne A. Kim, Reconstructing Family Privacy, 57
HASTINGS L.J. 557 (2005). Child welfare caseworkers are sometimes used for custody investigations in
non-domestic violence cases too. See Hill, supra note 6.
128. See MacDowell, Theorizing from Particularity, supra note 94.
129. Applicants for civil protection orders are also an especially vulnerable population, for other
reasons. Survivors of domestic violence often seek protection orders at a critical juncture, such as the
aftermath of an incident involving law enforcement, and this may be their first encounter with the court
system. See Troshynski & MacDowell, supra note 111 (finding in a comparison study of legal self-help
centers that sixty-five percent of litigants using the centers were going to court for the first time).
Researchers like Sally Engle Merry argue that survivors’ encounters with the legal system in this context
are pivotal in the development of their legal consciousness and willingness to use the system again. See
Sally Engle Merry, Rights Talk and the Experience of Law: Implementing Women’s Human Rights to
Protection from Violence, 25:2 HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 343 (2003).
130. See Murphy, Revitalizing the Adversary System, supra note 21.
131. See id. See also Kim, supra note 127, at 592–95 (describing the potentially protective function of
privacy for poor women).
132. Scholars, often writing from personal experience representing clients in the poor people’s courts
and in administrative tribunals, have documented the ways in which low-income women, especially those
of color, are disadvantaged by the lack of receptivity of legal decision makers to their speech, such that
their voices are silenced or simply not heard across differences of class, race, and the parameters of legal
or other professional discourse. See Bezdek, supra note 6 (describing ways in which tenants are silenced
in small claims court due to differences in speech and cultures of claiming); Catherine Therese Clarke,
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and practices of these courts reinforce hegemonic relationships between the poor
and not-poor, and the state and low-income people appearing before the court.
Fully discerning the task of access to justice in family courts requires placing
family court culture and practices within the context of poor people’s courts and
their role in maintaining social hierarchies. This context also demonstrates the
importance of an access to justice framework that addresses subordination and
power, which, as I explain in the following Part, current approaches fail to do.
II. MAINTAINING HEGEMONY IN THE POOR PEOPLE’S COURTS
A. Poor People’s Courts and Hegemony
All courts reinforce hegemony. Peter Gabel and Paul Harris, in their classic
article about counter-hegemonic law practice, state: “The principle role of the
legal system . . . is to create a political culture that can persuade people to accept
both the legitimacy and the apparent inevitability of the existing hierarchical
arrangement.”133 Courts perform this role by creating a culturally salient and
ritualized display of authority134 where litigants may contest rights within
narrowly framed legal discourses.135 However, the poor people’s courts do so in
particular ways that are significant for access to justice efforts. Unlike the
traditional image of an awe-inspiring and lofty court of law,136 poor people’s
courts are more akin to other places where low-income people go to seek services
or resolve disputes: administrative offices and agencies where, like the courts,
one is likely to find crowded and shabby waiting rooms, long waits, opaque and
frustrating procedures, and a predominance of black and brown-skinned people.137
Missed Manners in Courtroom Decorum, 50 MD. L. REV. 945 (1991) (describing how informal rules
regarding courtroom speech and decorum disadvantage outsiders); White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 6
(analyzing the ways in which welfare bureaucracies silence poor women of color).
133. Gabel & Harris, supra note 30, at 372.
134. See id. at 372–73 (“Taken as a whole, this display of legal symbolism lays the deep psychological
foundation for a political culture that substitutes identification with authority for real democratic
participation, and that substitutes fantasies of patriotic community for an actual community founded upon
love and mutual respect.”).
135. See id. at 373 (“Thus landlord–tenant law allows one to argue for increasing tenants’ rights, but
not to challenge the very existence of landlords and tenants because it has already been decided (by
‘founding fathers’) that freedom requires the protection of private property in its current form.”).
136. See id. at 372–73 (depicting the quintessential court of law, where “the participants are brought
before a judge in a black robe who sits elevated from the rest, near a flag to which everyone in the room
has pledged allegiance each day as a child; the architecture of the courtroom is awesome in its severity
and in its evocation of historical tradition; the language spoken is highly technical and intelligible only to
the select few who have been ‘admitted to the Bar.’”).
137. See Hill, supra note 6, at 528–29 (describing the family court’s “waiting rooms . . . filled—
standing room only—with mostly black and brown people, the majority of them women, waiting for their
cases to be called. Lawyers talked with clients in the hallways and on staircases, court officers yelled the
names of litigants into the waiting room, and many people walked about, looking lost.”); Bezdek, supra
note 6, at 535 (describing Baltimore’s rent court, “where a single judge deals with as many as 2500 cases
on a daily docket [and the] great proportion of tenants who appear are poor black women”). See also id. at
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These conditions are often exacerbated by jurisdictional divisions and funding
allocations138 that separate poor people’s courts from those more likely to be
utilized by litigants with greater financial resources and attorneys.139 In addition
to the black-robed judge, litigants in poor people’s courts are subject to the
authority of numerous other court staff and adjuncts that wield power over parties
and cases.140 Rather than decisions cloaked in formal rules, litigants in
delegalized courts are likely to contend with hard-to-discern informal standards,
or decisions that depart from rules altogether, so that the law appears opaque and
arbitrary.141 Along with sexist or racist remarks and commentary,142 these
disparities in the treatment of low-income litigants in the courts are degrading
and disheartening and stigmatize poor people as unworthy of equal justice.143
Moreover, normative biases about appropriate behavior for particular litigants
and failure to follow formal rules are related phenomena in poor people’s courts.
For example, Gary Blasi notes that judges in housing courts frequently develop
“a ‘law of the courtroom’ that is at odds with the controlling legal precedent” and
which corresponds with ideas about acceptable behavior for low-income
540 n. 21, n.22 (reporting that seventy-one percent of tenants appearing in rent court were women, many
of whom were accompanied by small children; eighty-seven percent appearing were black, and thirteen
percent were white).
138. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 6, at 61. Goodman writes: “The actual proceedings and
atmosphere of the housing court closely resemble a three-ring circus. In addition to the calendar part,
there are overflowing, mini-courtrooms for housing cases. At the same time, modern and spacious
courtrooms are reserved for commercial, tort and criminal cases and often go unused.” Id.
139. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 6, at 546. Describing the division of family law jurisdiction between
New York’s Family Court and Supreme Court, Hill notes that the “Supreme Court is a higher status court
than Family Court, and supreme court litigants tend to be better-off financially and more likely to be
represented by counsel.” Id. In addition, Family Court judges use staff from the city’s child protection
agency to evaluate custody cases. Id. at 540–41. In contrast, New York Supreme Court justices use
better-trained mental health professionals unassociated with the agency to conduct evaluations. Id. at
545–46. See also Goodman, supra note 6, at 61 (comparing conditions in New York City’s housing court
to other civil courts).
140. See Harrington, supra note 57, at 54 (noting “the view that court personnel should play a
proactive role in the socialized courts”).
141. The routine disregard of the law in the day-to-day operations of poor people’s courts is well
demonstrated by the conduct of the trial court described in Turner. In that case, the trial judge “spent less
than five minutes [on the case], made no findings on the record, . . . and sent Turner to jail for twelve
months.” Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart
v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 160 (2012).
142. See, e.g., Swent, supra note 11, at 61 (reporting that “[w]omen in most states reported that they
were subjected in court to inappropriate forms of address, . . . comments on their appearance, sexist jokes,
hostile remarks based on gender and even unwelcome sexual advances. The task forces found generally
that women in court are treated by judges and male lawyers as less credible than men, a finding that
encompasses women lawyers, witnesses, litigants and experts”). Also notable is the cavalier behavior
toward litigants that suggests they are not deserving of respect. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 6, at 61
(describing a housing court hearing officer telling a litigant to leave the courtroom during his own
proceeding because there was no where to sit).
143. See Goodman, supra note 6, at 61 (observing that the inadequacy of housing court as opposed to
other civil courts “is a statement of contempt for the majority of people whose only contact with the
judicial–legal system is in housing court”).
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tenants.144 Thus, application of the law in poor people’s courts may turn on
judicial assessment of whether litigants perform their identity according to
prevailing norms of acceptable behavior for poor people or other determinative
categories.145
Policies enforced by poor people’s courts also reinforce normative assump-
tions that systematically disadvantage low-income people and perform the
hegemonic function of structuring disputes so that underlying norms are
unassailable. For example, child-support policies embody the normative position
that financial support is the only valuable contribution noncustodial parents make
to their children, a standard that low-income mothers and fathers are particularly
challenged in meeting due to structural constraints, such as barriers to employ-
ment.146 However, disputes over current ability to pay do not permit contestation
of the underlying assumption. Similarly, conflict over the conclusions in a
custody evaluation rarely permits litigants to contest normative assumptions
about what makes a good home or parent that are embedded within such
evaluations under the guise of professional expertise.147 These and other routine
practices in poor people’s courts reinforce stereotypes about low-income people
in ways that closely resemble the ritualized degradation of the poor that Kaaryn
Gustafson describes as overtaking national welfare and criminal justice policies.148
Gustafson draws on the work of sociologists Harold Garfinkle and Harry
Murray to demonstrate how raced and gendered “degradation ceremonies”
function to normalize treatment of the poor in the United States as criminals and
cheats.149 Just as courts lend the imprimatur of legitimacy to hegemony, “[w]hat
makes the degradation of the poor in the United States ceremonious is the formal
and public nature of the degradation, a formality lent to the degradation through
the involvement of, or association with, the criminal justice system.”150 As
Gustafson explains, the function of degradation ceremonies is to “help us learn
what we know as social facts,” including our understanding of what constitutes
144. See THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH GRP., UCLA SCH. OF LAW, EVALUATION OF THE VAN NUYS LEGAL
SELF-HELP CENTER FINAL REPORT 15 (2001), available at www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/
Final_Evaluation_Van_Nuys_SHC2001.doc.
145. See supra Part I (discussing bias in family courts); see also MacDowell, Theorizing from
Particularity, supra note 94 (discussing how intersecting race, class, and gender identities of survivors
and perpetrators impacts judicial decisions in domestic violence cases).
146. See, e.g., Brito, supra note 120, at 646–47. Summarizing one study’s findings on barriers to
employment for low-income noncustodial fathers, Brito reports: “forty-three percent were high-school
dropouts, thirty-nine percent had health problems, and thirty-two percent had not worked in three years.
Overall, job prospects are not promising for men with already weak attachments to the labor force and
other significant barriers to employment.” Id. at 647. See also Cammett, supra note 122, at 146–47
(describing the poor employment prospects for noncustodial parents reentering society from prison).
147. See, e.g., Aziza Ahmed, Medical Evidence and Expertise in Abortion Jurisprudence (manuscript
on file with author) (discussing the ways in which representations of scientific expertise masks ideology).
148. Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies, supra note 43.
149. Id. at 105–06.
150. Id. at 106.
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“acceptable conduct” and who are “acceptable persons.”151 These ceremonies
“tend to differ for different groups, with the degradation ceremonies often
specific for marginalized groups based on their gender, age, race, and ethnic-
ity.”152 For example, “[f]or young African American and Latino men, police
stops, frisks, and automobile searches are common degradation ceremonies.”153
In contrast, degradation ceremonies for low-income women of color are
different, and largely organized around devaluation of their motherhood.154 As
described by Gustafson, the commonality across ceremonies is their symbolic
nature; like the operation of poor people’s courts, degradation ceremonies work
to reinforce both concepts of state authority and stereotypes related to subordina-
tion.155 The spectacle of degradation also performs expressive functions,
including legitimizing poverty and the conditions of the poor through criminaliza-
tion and punishment, and maintaining of myths that demonize black mothers.156
In Gustafson’s view, the virulent nature of degradation ceremonies in present-day
society indicates they also serve a sadomasochistic need among people to
“dominate and express disgust for human beings who are considered inferior.”157
Poor people’s courts perform the function of ceremonial degradation in the
civil system—a role that is supported by their ties to the punitive child welfare
system and an ever-increasing entanglement with the criminal justice system. In
performing these functions, poor people’s courts arguably go beyond the
hegemonic function of courts generally by simultaneously bolstering not only
state power (with the indirect effect of reinforcing subordination) but also
directly effectuating subordination. For example, subjecting low-income litigants
in custody cases to caseworker investigations from the child-protection agency
implies “they are likely to commit abuse or neglect.”158 This reinforces
stereotypes that associate low-income women of color with bad parenting and
criminality; subjecting domestic violence survivors to such investigations
reinforces stereotypes that women are somehow complicit in their own abuse.159
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 110–39 (detailing degradation ceremonies faced by low-income mothers of color through
criminalization of welfare fraud, criminal enforcement of public school enrollment restrictions against
low-income mothers seeking better educational opportunities for their children, and prosecution of poor
mothers for shoplifting baby formula and other necessities or utilizing “black market” sources for
necessary goods).
155. Id. at 107.
156. Id. at 139–46.
157. Id. at 149. This desire is masochistic, not merely sadistic, because it is engaged in without regard
to economic instability faced by most American and even by the poor themselves. Id. at 150.
158. Hill, supra note 6, at 541.
159. See, e.g., Jane Stoever, Freedom from Violence Using the Stages of Change Model to Realize the
Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 360 (2011) (describing the routine
victim-blaming perpetrated by family court judges).
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Lecturing and chiding litigants, typical of problem-solving court judges,160
infantilizes litigants and reinforces notions that low-income people appearing
before the court are childish and in need of state supervision.161 Family court
practices that force incarcerated litigants to appear in shackles for custody or
other hearings, without regard to risk posed,162 are forms of ritual humiliation
and shaming163 and also reinforce stereotypes associating the poor with criminal
conduct deserving of public condemnation.164 Despite the long history of
problems faced by low-income people in family and other poor people’s courts,
however, common access to justice strategies like Civil Gideon and self-help tend
to obscure the problem of state intervention and reinforce court practices
associated with subordination.165
160. Such conduct relates to the active judicial role of judges in problem-solving courts. See Eric
Lane, Due Process and Problem Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 944, 961 (2002). Lane quotes a
judge from another type of problem solving court—drug court—making a statement that is typical of
how family court judges perceive their role: “Well, one thing, I’m not sitting back and watching the
parties . . . and ruling. I’m getting very involved with families. I’m making clinical decisions to some
extent, with the advice of experts.” Id.
161. This is the logical flipside of the paternalism inherent in an active judicial “father.” Moreover,
stereotypes of racial minorities, particularly blacks, as child-like are deeply rooted in white American
culture. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1262 (1992)
(discussing dominant images of blacks in popular culture of the late eighteenth century as “that of the
docile and contented slave—child-like, lazy, illiterate, and dependent on the protection and care of a
white master”).
162. A Westlaw search turns up no law review articles on the shackling of adults in family court.
However, as a family law attorney with over a decade of experience in the family courts of two states, I
have found that some jurisdictions routinely shackle incarcerated litigants in child custody and other
private-party disputes, as well as in child-welfare cases, without regard to whether or not the litigant is
incarcerated for a violent crime or otherwise poses a threat. For the problem of shackling children in
juvenile court, see Bernard P. Perlmutter & John C. Lore III, Shackling Children in Juvenile Court: The
Growing Debate, Recent Trends, and the Way to Protect Everyone’s Interest, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. &
POL’Y 453 (2008); Bernard P. Perlmutter, “Unchain the Children”: Gault, Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
and Shackling, 9 BARRY L. REV. 1 (2007).
163. See Fatma E. Marouf, Immigrants Unshackled: The Unconstitutional Use of Restraints in
Removal Proceedings 35–41 (manuscript on file with author) (discussing cognitive impacts on restrained
individuals and citing studies).
164. See id. at 42–50. Also notable is the pillorying of child-support debtors for obligations often
initiated by the family court. In a number of states, counties publish names, photographs, and amounts
purportedly owed by child-support obligors. See, e.g., Most Wanted, RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEP’T CHILD
SUPPORT SERVS., http://dcss.co.riverside.ca.us/About/MostWanted/MostWanted.asp (identifying alleged
child-support debtors in Riverside County, CA) (last visited Mar. 8, 2015); Deadbeat Parents, MARICOPA
COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFF., http://mcso.org/DeadBeat/Default.aspx (ranking the bond amounts of Maricopa
County, AZ “deadbeat parents”) (last visited Mar. 8, 2015); Deadbeats, GARLAND COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEP’T, http://garlandcountysheriff.com/deadbeats/index.html (Garland County, Arkansas) (last visited
Mar. 8, 2015); Sheriff’s Deadbeat Moms and Dads, WASHINGTON COUNTY, ARK., http://co.washington.ar.
us/index.aspx?page!447 (Washington County, Arkansas) (last visited Mar. 8, 2015); Suwannee County
Sheriff’s Deadbeat Parents, SUWANNEE COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFF., http://suwanneesheriff.com/Deadbeat
Parents.aspx (Suwannee County, FL) (last visited Mar. 8, 2015).
165. See infra notes 173–209 and accompanying text.
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B. Current Approaches to Access to Justice: Civil Gideon and Self-Help
Most controversies about current approaches to access to justice revolve
around the issue of attorneys: whether the main focus of access to justice efforts
should be on providing attorneys (e.g., through implementing statutory or
constitutional Civil Gideon), or on alternatives to legal representation,166 such as
self-help.167 Critiques that question or explore the goals of such initiatives are
less common. Some access to justice scholars and activists argue that calls for
Civil Gideon are unrealistic, distracting reformers from more realistic goals and
failing to address the legal needs of non-indigent pro se litigants.168 Critics also
point to problems implementing Gideon in the criminal context, including
underfunded and overstressed public defender offices and weak protection
against ineffective assistance of counsel for defendants, as reasons to question the
wisdom of extending Gideon to civil cases.169 Existing provisions for civil
representation in poor people’s courts have faced problems similar to those
experienced by criminal defenders or simply remain unimplemented due to lack
of funding.170
166. See Blasi, Framing Access to Justice, supra note 3, at 914 (“Access to justice has come to be
framed rather narrowly into four components: (1) access of (2) an individual (3) to a lawyer, or some form
of assistance purported to be at least a partial substitute, (4) to help deal with a problem or dispute already
framed in legal terms.”).
167. The scope of self-help services overlaps with that of unbundled or “limited scope” legal services
provided by attorneys, such as ghostwriting or limited advice sessions, and is often part of a triage or
multi-pronged approach to service delivery that may include attorney representation (e.g., for the purpose
of ghostwriting, or at a subsequent hearing). See Jessica K. Steinberg, In Pursuit Of Justice? Case
Outcomes and the Delivery of Unbundled Legal Services, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 453, 461–64
(2011) [hereinafter Steinberg, In Pursuit]. Here, I use the term self-help to refer to legal services that
expressly do not involve the formation of an attorney–client relationship, regardless of whether or not the
self-help services are provided or supervised by attorneys or non-attorneys.
168. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 15, at 1250–69 (detailing arguments against pursuing a Civil
Gideon).
169. Id. at 1251–63; see also Rhode, Roadmap, supra note 15, at 1226–27 (noting the lack of
procedural protections for defendants with ineffective assistance of counsel).
170. See generally Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State Statutes Providing for a Right to Counsel in
Civil Cases, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. OF POVERTY L & POL’Y 245 (2006), available at http://
brennancenter.org/analysis/state-statutes-providing-right-counsel-civil-cases. As detailed by Abel and
Rettig, a patchwork of state laws have created the right to appointment of counsel in certain civil cases in
various jurisdictions, sometimes referred to as “Civil Gideon.” Id. at 245. However, lack of funding for
appointed counsel and inadequate (or frequently nonexistent) regulation and administration of civil
Gideon programs limit their effectiveness. Id. at 248–51. In addition, few states impose caseload limits
for appointed counsel, and only a few specify compensation rates; those states that do specify
compensation rates typically allow for fees that are far below what private attorneys earn for the same
type of work. Id. at 250 (observing that, in addition, “funding falls short of need almost everywhere”). As
a result, appointed counsel are often encouraged to take higher caseloads than they can reasonably
manage in order to make a living. Id. These problems are exacerbated by the absence in most states of a
unified system of administration for the right to counsel, resulting in “vastly different access to counsel in
different counties despite the presence of an applicable statewide law guaranteeing the right to counsel.”
Id. at 250–51. The case-by-case approach to the right to counsel in family cases established by the
Supreme Court further limits the value to poor families of state laws mandating or authorizing
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While alternatives to traditional representation like self-help services have
received less attention, critics of these services are concerned with the significant
shift in legal-aid resources toward providing one-time, generic legal information,
and with the untested assumption that this type of assistance is capable of
replacing individualized and ongoing legal support.171 These observers view
self-help as unlikely to empower litigants to deal with their legal issues unless it
is accompanied by access to other types of services and are particularly
concerned with the suitability of self-help services for socially marginalized
litigants.172 Another type of critique questions when attorneys (versus alterna-
tives) are really needed.173 Embedded in this discussion is a nascent debate about
what types of contributions attorneys make and how we should measure the value
of legal advocacy.174 This discussion gets closer, but only indirectly, to the issue
of what the function of access to justice efforts should be in poor people’s
courts.175
In a contrasting approach, some scholars have illuminated the normative
underbelly of access to justice.176 For example, Gary Blasi criticizes access to
appointment of counsel in civil cases. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31–32 (1981)
(adopting a case-by-case standard that “leave[s] the decision whether due process calls for the
appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings to be answered in the first
instance by the trial court, subject, of course, to appellate review”). Adopting this approach, the highest
court of at least one state has ruled that there is no ineffective assistance of counsel claim available for a
litigant who lacks a constitutional right to counsel in the first place. See, e.g., In re Parental Rights as to
N.D.O., 121 Nev. 379, 115 P.3d 223 (2005) (holding there is no action for ineffective assistance of
counsel where facts showed there was no constitutional right to appointment of counsel in a “routine”
termination of parental rights case).
171. See Jeff Giddings & Michael Robertson, Informed Litigants with Nowhere to Go: Self-Help
Legal Aid Services in Australia, 26 ALT. L.J. 184, 184–85 (2001).
172. See Jeff Giddings & Michael Robertson, Large Scale Map or the A–Z? The Place of Self-Help in
Legal Aid, in AFTER UNIVERSALISM: RE-ENGINEERING ACCESS TO JUSTICE 104–05 (Richard Moorhead &
Pascoe Pleasence eds., 2003) [hereinafter Giddings & Robertson, The Place of Self-Help in Legal Aid].
173. See, e.g., Gary Blasi, How Much Access? How Much Justice?, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 865 (2004)
[hereinafter Blasi, How Much] (noting the need for a way of measuring and comparing the value of
different interventions).
174. A recent colloquium at the University of Wisconsin about efforts to quantify the value of
advocacy and related articles calling for a more nuanced account of what legal advocates do for
low-income litigants are demonstrative. See Jane H. Aiken & Stephen Wizner, Measuring Justice, 2013
WIS. L. REV. 79 (2013) (arguing that much of what lawyers do for the poor is unquantifiable); Catherine
R. Albiston & Rebecca Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV.
101 (2013) (arguing that more theory is needed in order to properly frame a research agenda about the
value of legal services); Anthony V. Alferi, Community Education and Access to Justice in a Time of
Scarcity: Notes from the West Grove Trolley Garage Case, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 121 (2013) (exploring
community education as advocacy).
175. See, e.g., Aiken & Wizner, supra note 174, at 83–85 (detailing valuable but difficult to measure
legal services such as respectful and sympathetic listening, and explaining the absence of remedy,
practical advice, and informal advocacy).
176. See Blasi, Framing Access to Justice, supra note 3, at 939 (arguing for a broader conception of
access to justice); see also id. at 879 (advocating for legal services that help litigants evaluate the
potential legal significance of their interests; understand current and prospective rights, remedies, and
risks; participate in political and legal processes; and obtain outcomes based on the law and facts, rather
than differential access to resources, or their gender, race, or class); Smith, Poverty Warriors, supra note
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justice initiatives for being too narrowly framed in terms of how they conceive of
and address the legal needs of low-income people.177 He points out that reformers
are unlikely to get more than they ask for and encourages them to think more
expansively.178 In particular, Blasi argues that Civil Gideon initiatives short-
change poor litigants on equal justice by not providing lawyers at early enough
stages in the legal process or assisting them with collective action—both of
which are generally available to wealthier litigants.179 Instead, Civil Gideon is
generally conceived of as responding to discrete cases that have been framed by
individual litigants without the assistance of counsel.180 Blasi’s arguments for an
expanded notion of Civil Gideon are focused on increasing equality (by
providing litigants with the tools afforded wealthier litigants), effectiveness (by
providing lawyers early enough to shape strategy), and efficiency (by solving the
legal problems of multiple, similarly affected individuals at once).181 The context
of his examples—housing cases where tenants are challenging slum condi-
tions—is informative.182 He points out that collective action is often necessary
for such cases to be effective, and the active assistance of an advocate is often
necessary to make collective action possible, especially for litigants who are on
the social margins.183 Blasi ruminates that tenants might achieve more lasting
change by pursuing remedies other than landlord litigation, such as suing the
housing authority for lack of enforcement—strategies that would benefit from
attorney involvement in the shaping of the case early on.184 Blasi argues, in
essence, that providing low-income litigants with legal resources comparable to
those accessible to wealthier individuals is not only equalizing, and possibly
more effective and efficient, but has counter-hegemonic potential: to show
connections between the individual and the group, to challenge the normative
3, at 38 (observing that Civil Gideon isolates social problems as individualized cases). Smith is also
concerned with the impact that Civil Gideon might have on remaining legal aid programs that prioritize
strategies for attacking the roots of poverty and that consider the needs of communities, as well as
individuals. Id.
177. See Blasi, Framing Access to Justice, supra note 3 (advocating for a more expansive view of
access to justice); Blasi, How Much, supra note 173 (providing a multi-pronged rubric for evaluating
access to justice initiatives).
178. See Blasi, Framing Access to Justice, supra note 3, at 914 (“If we begin with [a] limited ambition
. . . then that is as far as we are likely to get.”).
179. See id. at 939. See also, Wexler, supra note 2, at 1053 (describing traditional law practice as
“hurt[ing] poor people by isolating them from each other, and fail[ing] to meet their need for a lawyer by
completely misunderstanding that need”). As Wexler opines, “Poor people have few individual legal
problems in the traditional sense; their problems are the product of poverty, and are common to all poor
people.” Id.
180. SeeBlasi, Framing Access to Justice, supra note 3, at 931–37.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 934–97.
183. See id. at 937–38 (describing a client in a slum housing case as “a remarkable woman, but long
hours in a garment industry sweatshop did not leave her much time to organize her fellow tenants. For
that, she needed some help, along with resources: a place to meet, help with copying and distributing
flyers, and so on . . . .”).
184. See id. at 935 (discussing how framing of the legal problem constrains possible responses).
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framing of legal problems, and to perhaps reveal the social, legal, and political
construction of power relationships (e.g., property ownership).185
Self-help services, which are expressly not intended to provide advocacy to
litigants, and other efforts to make the courts more user-friendly, have even less
transformative potential than conventionally conceived Civil Gideon. Like
providing attorneys in the absence of sufficient resources and procedural
protections, these services can work to legitimize an unjust legal system without
rendering it more effective.186 However, in the face of declining resources and
the lack of doctrinal support for court appointed counsel, the use of self-help
services and other alternatives to representation will likely continue to grow.
Therefore, addressing inadequacies in these services is important. Legal services
not informed by a counter-hegemonic goal potentially not only deprive litigants
of counter-hegemonic possibilities but also have the potential to reinforce
hegemony. This may happen in several ways.
First, traditional access to justice models work to isolate cases and clients and
reinforce the hegemonic nature of the legal system more generally—by
separating poor people from one another and isolating legal issues from one
another in artificial ways that bear negative consequences for already vulnerable
individuals. Legal issues and systems intersect in poor people’s courts and may
bring unwary litigants in contact with punitive state systems and processes. The
legal problems of low-income people arise in interconnected ways that can be
exacerbated when these intersections are not addressed.187 For example, the
divorce of a lower income couple is especially likely to involve legal issues
outside of family law, such as mortgage foreclosure or bankruptcy.188 Similarly, a
low-income applicant for a protective order may be especially vulnerable to
potential economic impacts of this course of action, such as loss of support from
the party subject to the order if he or she loses employment as a result.189 The
185. Gabel & Harris, supra note 30, at 374 (asserting that it is “precisely because the hierarchies of the
legal system are sustained only by people’s belief in them, legal conflicts of every type can become
opportunities to crack the fac¸ade of legitimacy that these hierarchies project”).
186. In fact, there are next to no independent empirical studies evaluating self-help services. See
Steinberg, In Pursuit, supra note 167, at 472–74 (citing only two studies of self-help services, both of
which are single-service centers).
187. Wexler, supra note 2.
188. In this context, women are especially vulnerable to the economic consequences of divorce. See,
e.g., LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985) (reporting a seventy-three percent decrease in
women’s standard of living post-divorce, and a forty-two percent increase for men). Single women with
dependent children are even more likely to fall into poverty. The 2010 U.S. census found the poverty rate
for women-headed families is 40.7%. See NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER, POVERTY AMONG WOMEN
AND FAMILIES, 2000-2010: EXTREME POVERTY REACHES RECORD LEVELS AS CONGRESS FACES CRITICAL
CHOICES 2 (2011) (announcing results of a study finding that that divorced women with children have a
harder time recovering economically after divorce), available at http://nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/
povertyamongwomenandfamilies2010final.pdf.
189. See Kim, supra note 127 (describing economic impacts of protective orders). Unable to afford
childcare, my former client ultimately faced possible removal of her children by Child Protective
Services after her estranged husband reported her for leaving them alone while she was at work.
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applicant’s “presenting problem”190 (domestic violence) may also implicate
matters such as housing, employment, debt, public benefits, and criminal and
immigration law issues, and raise numerous substantive family law issues and
non-legal needs such as safety planning.191 Legal services provided in a
piecemeal fashion and self-help-type services that typically do not provide advice
about the impacts of any particular course of action cannot address these
intersections. Ignoring the often complex and interrelated nature of such legal
problems leaves low-income people especially vulnerable to adverse conse-
quences and greater social marginalization.
Second, traditional legal services tend to reify the legal professional, and to
reinforce the inferiority of client knowledge and experience.192 As a result, they
may create dependency rather than developing capacity.193 According to Wexler,
“[t]he lawyer for poor individuals is likely, whether he wins cases or not, to leave
his clients precisely where he found them, except that they will have developed a
dependency on his skills to smooth out the roughest spots in their lives.”194 Given
the intractability of poverty and the fragility of legal services, providing legal
services in ways that encourage dependency rather than capacity is obviously a
problem for low-income communities.195 While self-help services sometimes
draw on the rhetoric of empowerment,196 providing limited assistance with forms
or legal information may not be sufficient to meet immediate legal needs197 and
190. See MacDowell & Cammett, supra note 49, at 13, 18 (distinguishing how a legal case is
identified and framed from the structural and systemic issues underlying it).
191. See Camille Carey, Correcting Myopia in Domestic Violence Advocacy: Moving Forward in
Lawyering and Law School Clinics, 21 COL. J. GENDER & L. 220 (2011) (advocating for a holistic
approach to representation of domestic violence survivors in order to address systemic problems and
those relating to structural inequality).
192. See GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW
PRACTICE 23–26 (1992) (describing the “regnant” view of lawyering, in which lawyers are heroic experts
and clients are helpless laypersons and how this view gains sway over lawyers and clients); Gabel &
Harris, supra note 30, at 407 (arguing that, “[o]nce the lawyer becomes a professional and the client
becomes a helpless layperson, the potential for oppositional energy that is produced by legal conflict will
be dissipated, and the system will be the winner whatever the outcome of the case”).
193. Wexler, supra note 2, at 1053.
194. Id.; cf. Edgar S. Cahn & Jean Camper Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73
YALE L.J. 1317, 1332 (1964) (arguing that service-oriented programs based on donor–donee relationships
tend to reinforce, rather than challenge, dependence in poor communities).
195. See Wexler, supra note 2, at 1053 (“Poverty will not be stopped by people who are not poor. If
poverty is stopped, it will be stopped by poor people. And poor people can stop poverty only if they work
at it together. The lawyer who wants to serve poor people must put his skills to the task of helping poor
people organize themselves.”).
196. See Greacen, supra note 111, at 24 (“many self-help programs have at their core a belief in
empowering litigants to take responsibility for their own affairs”); see also Giddings & Robertson, The
Place of Self-Help in Legal Aid, supra note 172, at 105 (explaining that notions of empowerment were
central to the development of self-help in Australian legal aid).
197. See THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH GRP., supra note 144, at 3 (reporting that self-help services in
landlord-tenant disputes made no difference in outcomes, as tenants receiving self-help services faring no
better in their cases than those who received no assistance); Steinberg, In Pursuit, supra note 167, at 482
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does not assist individuals or communities in addressing systemic problems.198
Third, legal services uninformed by counter-hegemonic goals will tend to
screen out or further marginalize litigants, narratives, and claims that run counter
to institutional norms, that staff members believe are inappropriate, or that are
non-routine and therefore less convenient.199 This is true for self-help services
and legal services involving attorneys. For example, observation of self-help
services in metropolitan areas in two western states found that self-help center
staff members assisting unrepresented litigants applying for domestic violence
protection orders treat some litigants differently, seemingly based on their view
of the litigant’s worthiness and whether or not they believe that the relief sought
was appropriate.200 Their relative approval was evidenced by shifts in their
demeanor, tone, or remarks to the litigant, as well as by the proffering or
withholding of information to the litigants they assisted.201 Negative responses
were most often directed toward applicants who did not conform to the staff
member’s ideas of appropriate or authentic victims.202 For example, applicants
who asked if monetary restitution was available were perceived by staff as
greedy.203 The clinics also fail to assist applicants with requesting all the relief
available in their cases, such as child or spousal support, and restitution and
attorney fees.204 Staff members instruct applicants on completing paperwork that
has legal implications and might impact the outcome of their case; for example,
some applicants are instructed to provide only information about recent incidents
of violence, rather than a complete history.205 In this way, these ostensibly neutral
legal service providers act as gatekeepers to the legal system.
Fourth, with limited resources and without a consciously counter-hegemonic
approach, service providers may fail to prioritize meaningful, proactive assis-
(finding that tenants who received assistance with forms in housing court had improved procedural
outcomes, such as avoiding default, but their substantive outcomes were not improved).
198. See White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 35, at 741 (describing a process of empowerment as
giving a community the tools to create change and challenge subordination); see also id. at 744 (helping
clients to reclaim cultural identity as a method of empowerment).
199. See Abel, supra note 46, at 567–70 (discussing the ways in which lawyers and others influence
what legal aid is rendered). The ways in which dominant narratives constrain practice is particularly well
established in the domestic violence context. See, e.g., MacDowell, Theorizing from Particularity, supra
note 94, at 541–46 (summarizing the arguments and theoretical basis for the existence of a domestic
violence discourse that limits recognition of survivors and claims). See also Abel, supra note 46, at 570
(observing that lawyers may prefer cases with clear rules and established law, thereby avoiding cases and
clients outside established bounds of practice).
200. Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Domestic Violence and the Politics of Self-Help (manuscript on file
with author).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. Staff members in one program attributed this policy to not having enough time to complete
the additional paperwork and to the lack of applicant preparedness (e.g., not having the right
documentation at the time of service). An administrator from another program thought staff members
were reluctant to advise clients about relief the court was unlikely to grant. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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tance, such as community education, or to explore more expansive modes for
action, such as system advocacy and social mobilization.206 Nor is there incentive
to develop mechanisms for transparency, critique, and accountability to low-
income communities.207 In the long run, these tendencies work in tandem to
reinforce the hegemonic status quo for all.
These problems demonstrate the limitations of access to justice discourses that
revolve around the presence or absence of attorneys. Imbalances of power extend
beyond appointment of counsel and whether only one party is represented to the
institutional culture and operation of poor people’s courts.208 Even winning a
case may inadvertently reinforce hegemonic constructs like social hierarchy.209 If
attorneys took cases within a counter-hegemonic framework for advocacy (e.g.,
cases that were disfavored by courts and/or challenged legal or other norms), they
might lose more often but serve poor people’s interests better in the long run.
What is needed is a multi-pronged approach to access to justice that accounts for
hegemony. This approach would help relate the delivery of individual services to
systemic change, illuminating and facilitating connections between individual
people and cases, and social issues. The next section draws on theories of social
justice advocacy that can inform a new access to justice model.
III. PRINCIPLES OF A COUNTER-HEGEMONIC APPROACH
A. Social Justice Advocacy
Social justice advocacy refers not only to method but also to a normative
vision of legal and other professionals and lay people working with clients to
resist subordination and transform systems. It is a counter-hegemonic practice.
As shown below, this vision has been addressed and developed within scholar-
ship on progressive lawyering, social work, and the field of lay advocacy for
survivors—all of which have particular relevance to access to justice within poor
people’s courts. In addition to the obvious role of lawyers in providing advocacy
in the courts, social workers trained on legal and other forms of client advocacy
have successfully partnered with lawyers to more holistically address client
206. See Smith, Poverty Warriors, supra note 3, at 38–39 (arguing that legal aid organizations are
already resistant to such pursuits in ways not explained by funding restrictions alone).
207. See Cahn & Cahn, supra note 194, at 1322–24 (describing incentives for leadership of legal
services programs, however well-meaning, to insulate themselves from criticism and stifle dissent).
208. See Russell Engler, Towards a Context-Based Civil Gideon Through Access to Justice Initiatives,
40 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 196, 202 (2006) [hereinafter Engler, Context-Based Civil Gideon] (observing
that which parties benefit from provision of counsel may depend on the type of case and differ from court
to court).
209. See, e.g., MacDowell, Theorizing From Particularity, supra note 94, at 549–58 (describing how
stereotypes about survivors and perpetrators and the performance of identity influence outcomes in
domestic violence cases in family court).
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needs.210 Domestic violence and other lay advocates are also important providers
of advocacy in the courts, especially for unrepresented litigants addressing
gender violence.211 Scholarship on these forms of advocacy has created a
collective wisdom and set of practices to inform a counter-hegemonic access to
justice project: one that seeks to counter, address, and mitigate the subordinating
effects of poor people’s courts, and the ways in which they directly and indirectly
reinforce hierarchies that oppress low-income people. Counter-hegemonic con-
sciousness is an essential component of this project.
Sociologists Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey identify three conditions
associated with counter-hegemonic consciousness: social marginality, recogni-
tion of the world as socially constructed, and opportunities for storytelling.212
According to Ewick and Silbey, the condition of social marginality contributes to
counter-hegemonic consciousness because “those who are most subject to power
are most likely to be acutely aware of its operation.”213 However, the experience
of social marginalization alone is not sufficient to recognize, much less challenge,
hegemony.214 Effective challenges also require an “understanding [of] how the
hegemonic is constituted as an ongoing concern.”215 Achieving counter-
hegemonic consciousness involves understanding the hidden nature of hege-
monic power and having opportunities to unmask it.216 These opportunities arise
through storytelling.217 Because storytelling is “a conventional form of social
interaction,” it most often arises in the routines and circumstances of everyday
life where people gather and talk, sit in in waiting rooms, or wait in line.218
Examples of more purposefully constructed opportunities include meetings of
community members organized for political, legal, or social change.219 Within
210. See, e.g., Robin Steinberg, Heeding Gideon’s Call in the Twenty-First Century: Holistic Defense
and the New Public Defense Paradigm, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 961 (2013); Paula Galowitz,
Collaboration Between Lawyers and Social Workers: Re-examining the Nature and Potential of the
Relationship, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2123 (1999).
211. See, e.g., Arlene N. Weisz, Legal Advocacy for Domestic Violence Survivors: The Power of an
Informative Relationship, 80 FAMS. SOC’Y: J. CONTEMP. HUMAN. SERVS. 138 (1999); Megan Allen et al.,
Voices from the Field: Civil Legal Advocacy at Stand-Alone Sexual Assault Programs, 16 CONNECTIONS
17 (2012), available at http://www.wcsap.org/sites/wcsap.huang.radicaldesigns.org/files/uploads/
resources_and_pubs/connections_2012_10/Connections_2012_10.pdf.
212. See EWICK & SILBEY, COMMON PLACE OF LAW, supra note 34, at 234–44 (1998); Ewick & Silbey,
Subversive Stories, supra note 34, at 220–22.
213. EWICK & SILBEY, COMMON PLACE OF LAW, supra note 34, at 234–35 (“By definition, it is the
marginal . . . whose lives and experiences are least likely to find expression in the culturally dominant
schemas and who have [the] most restricted access to resources.‘).
214. See William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law
Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1107–08 (1994)
[hereinafter Simon, Dark Secret].
215. EWICK & SILBEY, COMMON PLACE OF LAW, supra note 34, at 239.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 242.
219. For example, feminist consciousness-raising groups of the 1960s were an important site for the
development of counter-hegemonic consciousness challenging patriarchal construction of femininity and
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these shared moments, storytellers may question the status quo, create alternative
explanations for experience,220 and build community.221 In particular, social
justice advocates can organize their practice to disrupt the experience of legal
problems as isolated and apolitical and help individuals discover “the inherent
political content of common types of cases and [use] this political content to build
community organization.”222
1. Social Justice Lawyering
Underlying social justice lawyering is the basic idea that lawyers and their
allies can help clients resist and challenge subordination through the way they
perform and deliver legal services.223 While social justice lawyers may employ a
variety of methods, strategies, or tactics, there are at least four broad, interrelated
components of social justice lawyering that can be identified as characteristic of
the approach, including: education; collaborative work; a broad-based understand-
ing of what lawyering entails; and commitment to client empowerment and
transformation of people, relationships, and systems. These components distin-
guish social justice lawyering from traditional lawyering models (regardless of
the purpose for which they are employed) that focus on the lawyer as a technical
expert providing services to needful clients.224
The component of education is at the center of social justice lawyering:
education of the lawyer, as well as the client or community.225 The vision of
social justice education includes a mutually educative process in which both
lawyer and client are teaching (one another) and learning (together) about
problem solving.226 This process is enabled because, in contrast to the traditional
view of lawyering, both the lawyer and client are viewed as having important
knowledge that is relevant to resolve the problem at hand.227 Central to this
educative process is a related emphasis on communication. Social justice
lawyering has at its core a critical attention to the power of storytelling and
domesticity. Id. at 241; see also CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
83–90 (1989) (describing feminist consciousness-raising as a method for perceiving the socially
constructed nature of reality).
220. MacDowell, Law on the Street, supra note 32, at 315–16 (observing that, “even casual,
serendipitous meetings can uncover common experience within a confluence of constraints and
identities”).
221. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2411, 2414 (1989) (discussing the community-building functions of sharing stories).
222. Gabel & Harris, supra note 30, at 396.
223. As this implies, there exists on the flip side a possibility of disempowering clients through lack of
attention to social justice principles. See Simon, Dark Secret, supra note 214, at 1099–1100.
224. Artika R. Tyner, Planting People, Growing Justice: The Three Pillars of New Social Justice
Lawyering, 10 HASTINGS RACE & POV. L.J. 219, 220 n.2 (2013) (“Lawyering traditionally focuses on a
system of technocracy where the lawyer is an expert who offers technical services to a client.”)
225. See LOPEZ, supra note 192, at 70–71; White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 35, at 763.
226. See LOPEZ, supra note 192, at 70, 74.
227. See id. at 50–51.
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narrative,228 the value of reflective listening,229 and the role of lawyers in giving
voice to subordinated communities—not only as spokespersons, but also as
facilitators of speech.230 The concept of education within social justice lawyering
is embedded in history, and especially in local adaptations of legal, social, and
cultural struggle.231 Learning this history may involve recovering forgotten or
submerged knowledge, or reconstructing knowledge by both lawyer and client;
uncovering it informs ongoing struggles by allowing participants to remain
nimble and avoid uncritical attachment to particular strategies or methods.232
Social justice lawyering also emphasizes the importance of learning through
self-critique: a constant process of critical self-reflection, evaluation, and
strategic adjustment that ties theory to practice as a matter of everyday problem
solving within a broader anti-subordination agenda.233
Like the component of education, collaboration in social justice lawyering
relies on a relationship of respect and equality between lawyers and clients, rather
than a relationship in which the lawyer is the dominant participant.234 Collabora-
tion takes place among lawyers, clients, and communities; it also takes place
between lawyers and other professionals, as well as laypersons. The focus on
collaboration leads to a related focus on opportunities for group work, which
helps realize social justice goals in several respects. First, group work may be a
more efficient and effective method of action in circumstances that include
collective litigation or other legal action, community education, and problem
solving.235 Second, opportunities for collaborative group work are essential to
building counter-hegemonic consciousness through a creative dialectic that
deconstructs hegemony and constructs new relationships and understandings
within a social justice agenda.236
228. See Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of
Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861 (1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstruc-
tive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991). See also
LOPEZ, supra note 192, at 39 (describing lawyering as problem-solving through story telling).
229. See William Quigley, Letter to a Student Interested in Social Justice, 1 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST.
7, 17 (2007) (providing a framework for reflective listening for social justice lawyers).
230. Id. (describing social justice lawyering as seeking to hear excluded voices and providing
opportunities for those voices to be heard).
231. See LOPEZ, supra note 192, at 66–67. Therefore, helping communities to recover positive cultural
practices that can inform community problem-solving or resistance is an important social justice
advocacy practice. See White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 35, at 744.
232. See LOPEZ, supra note 192, at 67.
233. See id. at 65–66.
234. Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths from Rhetoric to
Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157, 158 (1994) (describing a vision of lawyering in which it is not a not a
“unidirectional professional service” but a “collaborative, communicative practice”).
235. See, e.g., Blasi, Framing Access to Justice, supra note 3, at 937–38 (discussing need for
collective action in housing cases).
236. See Delgado supra note 221, at 2415 ( “[Such stories] can show that what we believe is
ridiculous, self-serving, or cruel. They can show us the way out of the trap of unjustified exclusion. They
can help us understand when it is time to reallocate power. They are the other half—the destructive
half—of the creative dialectic.”).
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Social justice lawyering also involves the understanding that lawyering
includes everyday acts, rather than mere technical expertise.237 These everyday
acts include storytelling and routine approaches to solving problems and
manipulating power. Social justice lawyers must become conscious of claiming
these everyday methodologies to further social justice goals.238 As Gerald Lopez
describes, this process “entails the participation of lawyers in helping everyone
(themselves included) to see that the skills they have already developed to cope
with problems of everyday life can be used to solve less familiar problems” and
contexts.239 In particular, “if people subordinated by political and social life can
learn to recognize and value and extend their own problem-solving know-how,
they . . . may gain confidence in their ability to handle situations that they would
otherwise experience as utterly foreign and unmanageable, with or without a
lawyer as representative.”240 Lopez distinguishes this view from perspectives
that either romanticize the ability of poor people to solve social ills or comport
with conservative “pull yourselves up by your own bootstrap” views that justify
withdrawing supportive assistance and services.241 He views teaching self-help
and lay lawyering as part of a participatory and democratic approach to political
life, “a vision where public institutions and professional service providers help
people help themselves, in much the same way that people in subordinated
communities, at least at their best, have long taken responsibility for themselves
and one another.”242
This broad-based approach to lawyering also involves embracing nontradi-
tional lawyering methods, including the educational component of social justice
lawyering, and mobilizing and organizing clients and communities around social
justice objectives.243 Each of these methods is interrelated and connected to
counter-hegemonic objectives: develop capacity within subordinated communi-
ties and equalize relationships between lawyers and clients by identifying and
valuing everyday problem-solving skills; and learn how to dismantle hierarchy
and mobilize collective action through education.244 These methods are also
central to an overarching commitment to empowerment and transformation—the
final component of social justice lawyering.
237. See LOPEZ, supra note 192, at 62–65 (discussing how social change goals can be implemented
throughout the workday through many “practical moments”).
238. Id.
239. LOPEZ, supra note 192, at 70.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 72.
242. Id. at 73.
243. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 2, at 1053 (describing organizing as the most important work of a
lawyer who wants to serve the poor).
244. See, e.g , LOPEZ, supra note 192, at 77 (describing what links lawyers and their allies to
subordinated people as a double commitment: “They regard every form of group work as important to
mobilization, and they consider educational aims as central to every form of mobilization.”).
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A commitment to empowerment and transformation infuses and informs the
pursuit of each of the other component parts of social justice lawyering.245
Through social justice-oriented education, clients develop “the agency and
capacity to . . . change oppressive patterns and behaviors in themselves and in the
institutions and communities of which they are a part.”246 Through collaborative
works, this commitment extends to social justice lawyers as well as clients,
“because communities and lawyers recognize the power within their hands to
challenge subordination, exercise power, and create systemic change.”247 The
goal is mutual empowerment and transformation as part of an anti-subordination
project that also transforms systems and relationships to power. Together,
lawyers and clients work to facilitate learning, reorganize social relationships,
and initiate action to create systemic change. Social justice lawyering is a
process-oriented practice wherein lawyers are engaged in “helping a group learn
how to interpret moments of domination as opportunities for resistance.”248
Within this context:
The lawyer cannot simply dictate to the group what actions they must take.
Neither the lawyer nor any single individual is positioned to know what actions
the group should take at a particular moment. Sound decisions will come only
as those who know the landscape and will suffer the risks deliberate together.
The role of the lawyer is to help the group learn a method of deliberation that
will lead to effective and responsible strategic action.249
While much of social justice lawyering scholarship is conceived around
collective action, its insights are applicable to, and beneficially inform, services
geared toward individuals as well.250 Social justice advocates flow back and forth
from individual needs to group and structural concerns, and deliver services in
ways that take the importance of both the individual and the collective into
account.
245. See White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 35, at 746 (describing client empowerment as the
common theme of progressive, social justice lawyering).
246. Tyner, supra note 224, at 231. See also Simon, Dark Secret, supra note 214, at 1102 (“The
prescribed goal of the new scholarship is ‘empowerment’ or enhancing the autonomy of the client. This
means, first, minimizing the lawyer’s own power or the social power the lawyer would otherwise tend to
implement. Second, it means enlarging the client’s capacities for self-assertion. The idea is to enable, or at
least not disable, clients to assert their own goals, to draw on the insight they already have, and to act on
their own behalf.”).
247. Tyner, supra note 224, at 231.
248. White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 35, at 763.
249. Id. at 763–64.
250. See, e.g., LOPEZ, supra note 192, at 83–329 (providing detailed examples of the application of
social justice lawyering theories and methods in various lawyering contexts involving direct legal
services).
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2. Non-Legal Advocacy Models
a. Social Work Advocacy
Social work advocacy is informed by values that are similar in many respects
to those at the core of social justice lawyering. These values include respecting
the dignity and rights of individuals (e.g., every human being is unique and
deserving); addressing imbalances of power and injustice (e.g., by giving voice to
marginalized groups and individuals); facilitating self-determination (e.g., by
helping clients to identify their own needs and actions they will take to fulfill
them); compassion and the desire to relieve suffering; empowering through
action-oriented advocacy (e.g., to help clients take action to solve problems); and
honoring social justice.251 Social workers also pursue social justice through
multiple practice methods, many of which are similar to those used by social
justice lawyers, including “direct practice, community organizing, supervision,
consultation, administration, advocacy, social and political action, policy devel-
opment and implementation, education, and research and evaluation.”252 Like
social justice lawyers, the goals of social work include “enhanc[ing] the capacity
of people to address their own needs [and] promot[ing] the responsiveness of
organizations, communities, and other social institutions to individuals’ needs
and social problems.”253 However, social work (like law) is embedded in
contradiction insofar as it is practiced within “the same structural base that
creates the poverty and abuses of its clients.”254 This has led to a tendency to
focus on explanatory paradigms for client problems that are focused on the
individual rather than structural issues.255 In response, progressive social work
scholars have developed alternative theories that explicitly take structural
inequality and subordination into account.256
251. ROBERT L. SCHNEIDER & LORI LESTER, SOCIAL WORK ADVOCACY: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
ACTION 78–79 (2001). See also NAT’L ASS’N OF SOC. WORKERS, NASW CODE OF ETHICS 2006, Preamble
(rev. 2008), available at http://www.socialworkers.org/pubs/code/code.asp (identifying the core values
of social work as service, social justice, dignity and worth of the person, importance of human
relationships, integrity, and competence). The NASW Code of Ethics further states, “Social workers
promote social justice and social change with and on behalf of clients . . . . Social workers are sensitive to
cultural and ethnic diversity and strive to end discrimination, oppression, poverty, and other forms of
social injustice.” Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Stephen M. Rose, Advocacy/Empowerment: An Approach to Clinical Practice for Social Work,
17 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 41, 41 (1990).
255. Id.; see also Anne Marie McLaughlin, Clinical Social Workers: Advocates for Social Justice, 10
ADVANCES SOC. WORK 51, 51 (2009) (noting critiques of social workers for a lack of attention to social
justice issues).
256. See McLaughlin, supra note 255, at 53. These approaches are also in keeping with the NASW
Code of Ethics, which notes that, “Social workers are sensitive to cultural and ethnic diversity and strive
to end discrimination, oppression, poverty, and other forms of social injustice.” NAT’L ASS’N OF SOC.
WORKERS, supra note 251. See also id. at § 1.05 (c) (“Social workers should obtain education about and
seek to understand the nature of social diversity and oppression with respect to race, ethnicity, national
origin, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, marital status, political belief,
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For example, Stephen Rose offers a model for clinical social work practice
based on “advocacy/empowerment theory.”257 The basic premise is that aware-
ness of the social and historical construction of one’s experience helps
individuals create change.258 Advocacy/empowerment theory helps clients
contextualize their experiences within personal and social history (“contextualiza-
tion”); provides them with the support necessary to self-identify and produce a
range of solutions that meet their needs (“empowerment”); and creates opportuni-
ties for them to locate their experience within social reality, including through the
process of contextualization, and also through opportunities for group work
(“collectivity”).259 Collectivity gives rise to the ultimate goal of the advocacy/
empowerment model: social development, or transformation. As Rose describes,
“transformation becomes the other dimension of collectivity, with the purpose
being movement from a position of dependency and individual deficits, through
contextualization, empowerment, externalization, critical reflection, and action to
a position and experience of participation and conscious involvement in
interdependent networks of social support.”260 As in social justice lawyering, this
transformative process requires attention to the communicative process, or what
Rose refers to as “a commitment to dialogue.”261 The social worker must enter
the client’s reality through listening, encourage elaboration of the client’s views,
and articulate support for the client’s understanding of their situation.262
However, uncovering social reality also requires helping clients to externalize
their situation and examine it critically to reveal its social nature.263 In this way,
“clinical dialogue is formed with two elements of expertise, one belonging to
each participant, each assuming the necessity of producing communication that
can develop and clarify the individual’s experience of her/his contextual
participation.”264
Rose’s theory of advocacy is similar to the social justice lawyering approach in
that it is process-oriented, and psycho-social in focus, with an ultimate goal of
transformation and empowerment; it is also similar in its collaborative nature,
religion, immigration status, and mental or physical disability.”); § 4.02 (“Social workers should not
practice, condone, facilitate, or collaborate with any form of discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity,
national origin, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, marital status, political
belief, religion, immigration status, or mental or physical disability.”); § 6.04 (“Social workers should act
to prevent and eliminate domination of, exploitation of, and discrimination against any person, group, or
class on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or
expression, age, marital status, political belief, religion, immigration status, or mental or physical
disability.”).
257. See Rose, supra note 254.
258. Id. at 45.
259. Id. at 46–50.
260. Id. at 50.
261. Id. at 47.
262. Id. at 46.
263. Id.
264. Id.
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and its emphasis on communication and mutuality. In a compatible, applied
approach, Anne Marie McLaughlin locates social justice advocacy within social
worker practice.265 Noting the lack of attention to social justice advocacy
practice in social work literature and pedagogy,266 McLaughlin addresses this
gap by studying the advocacy strategies of social workers working with
mental-health clients.267 Her study identifies social justice aims embedded within
three types of advocacy strategies engaged in by clinical social workers:
instrumental advocacy, which involves holding systems accountable; educational
advocacy, which includes educating individuals, families, and also colleagues
and the larger society about client issues; and practical advocacy, which includes
all varieties of hands-on assistance provided to clients—from assisting with
forms, to advocating on behalf of clients before administrative bodies.268 She
finds that each of these forms of advocacy are multidimensional, as they may be
implemented on behalf of an individual or marginalized group or involve action
directed toward achieving a more just society.269 This definition connects social
justice to the very action of advocacy.270 Social workers employing these
strategies were attentive to multiple forms of social justice, including distributive
issues (such as equitable access to resources) and issues of power and
subordination, including how individuals and groups experience social marginal-
ization, stigmatization and powerlessness.271 Because they are “adept at under-
standing the interplay between the person and their environment,” McLaughlin
finds that social workers are motivated to maintain a social justice stance in
relation to their work.272
b. Lay Advocacy for Survivors
Advocacy for survivors of domestic and sexual violence performed by lay
advocates differs from the models discussed thus far, in that it is historically
grounded in a feminist praxis focused on women’s empowerment and social
change activism and is situated outside the bounds of professional, hierarchical,
and bureaucratic institutions. As described by Andrea Nichols, “[e]arly radical
feminist advocates worked toward collaborative survivor-defined practices
265. See McLaughlin, supra note 255.
266. Id. at 52.
267. Id. at 54–55 (describing methodology).
268. Id. at 56–60.
269. Id. at 57, tbl.1. See also RICHARD HOEFER, ADVOCACY PRACTICE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 8 (2006)
(defining social justice advocacy as “[t]hat part of social work practice where the social worker takes
action in a systematic and purposeful way to defend, represent, or otherwise advance the cause of one or
more clients at the individual, group, organizational or community level, in order to promote social
justice”).
270. See McLaughlin, supra note 255, at 56 (noting that social workers interviewed in her study used
advocacy as a proxy for social justice).
271. Id. at 62.
272. Id. at 63.
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because they saw hierarchical practices as patriarchal and oppressive to
women.”273 An intersectional analysis of domestic violence and feminist praxis
was a part of this early feminist response.274 In particular, “[b]lack and lesbian
feminists noted that the ways that intersecting identities interacted with
patriarchy impacted survivor’s experiences with domestic violence and the
systems that addressed it.”275 Advocates used this insight to develop intersec-
tional advocacy practices that aimed to increase the accessibility and effective-
ness of services.276 To change structural conditions, advocates also worked to
increase support services for abused women and expand public and political
awareness of the problem of domestic violence.277
Professionalization of domestic violence services has been criticized due to the
apparent cooptation of feminist advocacy strategies and their subsequent
dilution.278 Research shows that advocates in professionalized advocacy organi-
zations and those in partnership with social service institutions become distanced
from the structural and gendered understandings of domestic violence and from
social change activism.279 The result is that standardized services replace the
feminist-informed activist model.280 Yet lay advocates for survivors of domestic
and sexual abuse continue to play an important role in helping clients navigate
legal and non-legal options for addressing gender violence.281 Like social justice
advocates in law and social work, lay advocates generally operate from
client-centered perspectives to empower clients to reach their self-determined
goals.282
Legal contexts for lay advocacy for survivors include helping clients pursue
civil options such as protective orders and criminal interventions like arrest and
prosecution.283 Advocates can play an important role in providing legal
273. Andrea J. Nichols, Meaning-Making and Domestic Violence Victim Advocacy: An Examination
of Feminist Identities, Ideologies, and Practices, 8 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 177, 178 (2013).
274. Id. at 180.
275. Id.
276. Id.; see also id. 191 (noting advocates used their awareness of multiple oppressions to advocate
for survivors within the legal system, service organizations, and even their own organizations).
277. Id. at 181.
278. Id. at 182.
279. Id.
280. Id.; see also KRISTEN BUMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE STATE: HOW NEOLIBERALISM APPROPRIATED THE
FEMINIST MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE 70 (2008) (“Currently, as part of the process of making
battered women’s shelters more professional, a mandate exists for changing the primary methods by
which shelters work—requiring them to move away from encouraging women’s transformation through
consciousness raising to a more service-oriented model that involves administrating clients’ needs.”).
281. Kenneth H. Kolb, Victim Advocates’ Perceptions of Legal Work, 17 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
1559, 1560 (2011).
282. See, e.g., M. Joan McDermott & James Garofalo, When Advocacy for Domestic Violence
Backfires: Types and Sources of Victim Disempowerment, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1245, 1248
(2004).
283. Kolb, supra note 281, at 1559.
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information and advice to survivors that are unrepresented by attorneys.284
Advocates may also accompany survivors to court and stand with them at
counsel’s table in civil proceedings to provide information and support.285
However, exercising legal options can heighten danger for survivors of abuse.286
Therefore, individualized, ongoing safety planning is an essential component of
lay advocacy.287 Empowerment is also a component of safety-focused, client-
centered advocacy.288 In this context, lay advocates for survivors perform what
Kenneth Kolb calls “care work” and “legal work.”289 Kolb defines care work as
“listening patiently to clients, giving them control over the conversation, and
empathizing with them when appropriate.”290 Legal work involves “informing
clients about how to exercise their legal options, both criminal . . . and
civil . . . .”291 In practice, lay advocates shift back and forth between these forms
of work.292 Advocates’ ability to provide valuable information (e.g., about legal
rights and remedies) in conjunction with emotional support is essential to their
success. As Arlene Weisz explains, “[a]dvocacy is successful when it includes
empathetic relationships and empowerment through information.”293 Survivors
284. See Weisz, supra note 211, at 142 (discussing the role of advocates in domestic violence cases);
Allen et al., supra note 211 (describing advocacy services for survivors of sexual assault). A study of
sexual assault protection order hearings found when lay advocates provided survivors seeking protection
orders with legal advocacy in court, “there was an eighty percent success rate in getting the order granted,
compared with a thirty-four percent success rate for petitioners without an advocate.” Id. at 8. The
difference in outcomes was attributed “to advocates keeping petitioners engaged in the process,
conveying what to expect at court, and determining whether a [protection order] is the appropriate
remedy.” Id. See also Stoever, supra note 159, at 347 (discussing the need for advocates where “[a]lmost
all petitioners [for domestic violence protection orders] enter the system pro se, and only a fortunate few
are able to obtain counsel after filing their cases”).
285. See Stoever supra note 159, at 352.
286. See id. at 335.
287. See JILL DAVIES & ELEANOR J. LYON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ADVOCACY: COMPLEX LIVES/DIFFICULT
CHOICES 3–5 (2013) (defining woman-centered advocacy based on a partnership with the survivor in
which a feasible safety plan is implemented).
288. See Stoever supra note 159, at 348 (“Women’s sense of empowerment and ability to take greater
control over their lives is considered critical to achieving freedom from violence, and an informative and
empathic advocacy relationship can foster such empowerment.”); see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 388-61A-0145 (2009) (“Advocacy-based counseling means the involvement of a client with an
advocate counselor in an individual, family, or group session with the primary focus on safety planning
and on empowerment of the client through reinforcing the client’s autonomy and self determination.”);
Joanne Belknap & Hillary Potter, The Trials of Measuring the “Success” of Domestic Violence Policies,
4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 559, 561 (2005) (“Victim empowerment is probably the most important
focal point of any implementation or continuation of DV policies.”).
289. Kolb, supra note 281, at 1562.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.; see also Weisz, supra note 211, at 141 (noting that most interactions between advocates and
survivors in a study involved advocates providing “information within the context of an emotionally
supportive relationship”).
293. Weisz, supra note 211, at 145. Weisz’s interviews with survivors demonstrate that “advocates can
have a powerful influence on survivors that contributes to the survivors’ increased participation in the
legal system.” Id. Other researchers note, however, that institutional and other factors may lead advocates
to overemphasize legal remedies, despite their potentially negative impacts on survivors. Kolb, supra
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appreciate advocates for the comfort of their physical presence during stressful
encounters with legal and other systems, their empathy, and their provision of
vital information about rights and remedies.294
Lay advocates for survivors also engage in advocacy at what M. Joan
McDermott refers to as “individual and institutional levels.”295 Advocacy at the
individual level helps clients understand options, negotiate legal systems, and
“obtain access to important resources such as housing, financial assistance, and
education.”296 Advocacy at the institutional level includes “working to change
institutional practices or policies that work against the needs of battered women
and includes activities such as lobbying legislatures, working with criminal
justice agencies at a local level, or even law enforcement training.”297 The goal of
both individual and institutional-level advocacy work is to empower survivors.
At the individual level, empowerment is conceptualized as helping survivors gain
a sense of personal agency and take an active stance in fighting their oppression.
At the institutional level, advocacy is viewed as helping to ensure that legal
processes are responsive to survivors’ needs and, more broadly, that the state
responds appropriately to violence against women, regardless of the views of
individual survivors.298 Advocates who conceptualize themselves as engaged in
social change activism also view advocacy with individual women as influencing
change on a broader level. By sending a message to the larger community that
violence toward women is not tolerated, advocates believe they help to create a
safer community for the women who live there.299
B. Taking Expertise into Account
As demonstrated above, law, social work, and lay advocacy for survivors offer
rich traditions and models of social justice advocacy for an access to justice
note 281, at 1567–70 (identifying reasons for advocates’ devaluation of care work in favor of legal work,
including devaluation of care work performed by women, the stigma of survivor advocacy, and lack of
professional credentials).
294. Weisz, supra note 211, at 145–46.
295. McDermott & Garofalo, supra note 282, at 1247.
296. Id. See also Stoever, supra note 159, at 353 (“To sustain abuse survivors . . . and effectively
eliminate domestic violence, advocates and attorneys should be encouraged to return to the roots of the
feminist response to domestic violence. Namely, advocates and attorneys should listen to battered women
and then provide comprehensive, individualized responses to their physical, environmental, and
emotional needs beyond the entry of a court order.”). Notably, absent an individualized, client-centered
approach, lay advocacy can also backfire, such as when it is unwanted or results in unintended
consequences. See McDermott & Garofalo, supra note 282, at 1246 (arguing that an emphasis on
offender accountability and survivor protection results in disempowerment when responses fail to meet
the self-identified needs of survivors).
297. McDermott & Garofalo, supra note 282, at 1247.
298. Id. at 1248. See also Davies & Lyon, supra note 287, at 14–16 (describing how systemic
advocacy informed by the needs and perspectives of victims complements individual victim-defined
advocacy).
299. Nichols, supra note 273, at 192.
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project that seeks to increase the experience of justice, as well as access. These
models also suggest the different types of expertise that these fields might offer to
such a project and how they might compliment one another. Lawyers, for
example, have been identified as having three components of professional
expertise: substantive, relational, and strategic.300 As described by Colleen
Shanahan, “[s]ubstantive expertise is the abstract and principled knowledge held
by professionals and gained through formal training.”301 This form of expertise
includes the principles and rules of law.302 In contrast, relational expertise
“involves understanding how to navigate the human relationships within which a
professional’s work takes place including how to behave and how to communi-
cate with others.”303 Specifically, relational expertise includes conduct with other
legal professionals, including “judges, court staff, clients, and other attor-
neys.”304 Strategic expertise synthesizes both substantive and relational exper-
tise, and makes capable lawyers distinctly valuable to their clients.305 As
Shanahan explains, “[t]he concept of strategic expertise captures how lawyers
make choices by synthesizing the rules that govern their work and the informal
relationships they navigate in the course of that work.”306
Social workers and lay advocates for victims also offer valuable forms of
expertise. Social workers may have more knowledge and experience about social
welfare and other administrative systems than is typical of lawyers.307 Lay
advocates understand survivor services and offer deep knowledge about gen-
dered violence, the impact of other, intersecting, forms of oppression on
survivors’ experiences, and the challenges faced by survivors in legal systems
and other institutions.308 Both types of advocates also have greater expertise in
care work, including empathy. As Robin Steinberg summarizes, writing about
social workers working with lawyers is an interdisciplinary practice. “Their
training makes them better listeners than lawyers. They are uniquely aware of the
services available in the community, and they are adept at determining an
effective defense strategy based on client needs and the client’s history.”309 This
300. See Colleen F. Shanahan et al., Representation in Context: Party Power and Lawyer Expertise 6
(Aug. 11, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/
1368.
301. Id. at 13. See also DAVIES & LYON, supra note 287, at 14–16 (describing how systemic advocacy
informed by the needs and perspectives of victims complements individual victim-defined advocacy).
302. DAVIS & LYON, supra note 287, at 14–16.
303. Id. at 14.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 77 (describing strategic expertise as “the hallmark of quality legal representation
and . . . inextricably linked with good judgment and zealous representation”).
306. Id. at 6.
307. See Galowitz, supra note 210, at 2126 (noting that social workers are also adept at “interviewing,
evaluation, crisis intervention, short-term casework, negotiation, and referral”).
308. See Nichols, supra note 273, at 194 (describing advocacy practices among feminist-identified lay
advocates).
309. Steinberg, supra note 210, at 988–89.
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is not to say that working in multi or interdisciplinary teams is not without its
challenges.310 However, as a result of their differing types of expertise, social
workers and lay advocates can contribute to a deeper knowledge of client context
and afford more holistic services than can traditionally trained lawyers acting
alone.311
Lay advocates contribute a focus on safety to access to justice efforts that is
particularly relevant to low-income people facing legal problems in poor people’s
courts. Low-income people experience violence within state and social systems
as well as interpersonal violence.312 Their experiences in court may increase their
vulnerability to such violence and exacerbate other forms of oppression.313
Although lay advocates for survivors generally concentrate on male-perpetrated
violence against women, the concept of safety can potentially be broadened using
a social justice lens to recognize how it applies to low-income litigants in poor
people’s courts more generally.314
Lay advocates may also make a different sort of contribution: they act as a
reminder of the role that (at least partial) outsider status and political commitment
plays in successful advocacy. The nonprofessional, lay expertise of advocates for
survivors renders them participant–outsiders in the legal realm, where they are
neither lawyers nor have another, allied professional status. This outsider stance
lends their advocacy its critical edge; their very status as non-professionals
renders their advocacy political and is identified by scholars as key to their
success in this role.315 However, this critical edge is often lost in the bureaucratic
310. See, e.g., Galowitz, supra note 210, at 2135–44 (discussing potential conflicts between social
workers and attorneys due to tensions deriving from differing ethical obligations, roles, and professional
values).
311. See MacDowell, supra note 32, at 317–25 (describing how traditional legal education distances
law students from the lived realities of low-income people and from social justice goals); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What’s Missing from the MacCrate
Report—of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REV. 593, 619–20 (1994)
(discussing lawyers’ lack of “empathy training” in law school).
312. See MacDowell & Cammett, supra note 49, at 5–6 (noting the connection between “the
interpersonal nature of domestic violence [and] other forms of social violence, including gang and other
violence perpetrated in communities marginalized by poverty, racial subordination, and criminalization,
violence within spaces of state custody and control such as prisons . . . and in other spaces and
institutions occupied by low-income people, like the military”).
313. See id. at 5 (“Victims who do not conform to normative stereotypes can be re-traumatized and
disillusioned by the responses of courts and other systems to their claims.”).
314. See id. at 5–6 (describing a clinical law program that helps students identify the gendered nature
of structural violence using a social justice framework). Notably, the feminist theory of intersectionality
is particularly useful in identifying, connecting, and addressing multiple forms of violence. See id. at
13–15 (describing the role of intersectionality theory in teaching law students to recognize and analyze
multidimensional subordination and gendered violence).
315. See Elizabeth Ben-Ishai, The Autonomy-Fostering State: “Coordinated Fragmentation” and
Domestic Violence Services, 17 J. POL. PHIL. 307, 323 (2009). It is through lay advocates’ partiality to the
needs and concerns of survivors that they operate to apply pressure, provide feedback, and initiate a type
of “imminent critique” within state systems and institutions that claim neutrality. See id. Ben-Ishai argues
that coordinated community responses to domestic violence “support the perpetual questioning of
‘impartial’ decisions and procedures undertaken by the criminal justice and legal system via a system of
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and professionalized settings that typify contemporary service organizations.
When advocates become too close to the state systems within which they operate,
they may lose their partiality to survivors and the outsider viewpoints that make
them effective.316
These observations raise the larger question: what does it mean to move social
justice advocacy into the setting of an institutionalized access to justice project?
There are several broad, interrelated aspects to the issue: one aspect is the
relationship between legal service projects and state institutions like courts;
another is how such projects navigate the relationship between legal service
needs and legal reform goals, and make decisions about cases and priorities; and
a third is how individual advocates view the relationship between ideology and
services in their work. The next section looks briefly at the last aspect and how it
relates to organizational issues more generally. The first two aspects are
considered in more detail in Part IV.
C. Cause Commitments and Client Services
Lack of organizational support for social justice goals is an obvious barrier to
social justice advocacy.317 Promoting social justice goals within an organization
requires implementing strategies to support social justice perspectives and
practices.318 Surfacing ideology and harmonizing goals is necessary for consis-
tency and accountability within organizations pursing social justice and social
change agendas.319 Research on the relationship between domestic violence
lay-advocacy and feminist ideology helps further illustrate these issues.
For example, advocates within professionalized models of advocacy tend to
view “domestic violence as an individual-level problem rather than [one]
stemming from an unequal distribution of societal resources and power and thus
[have] no inclination toward social change activism.”320 More pointedly, in a
study of domestic violence advocates, Nichols found that “if advocates do not
have feminist meanings of domestic violence, they are less likely to make the
structural-level changes necessary to reduce inequalities that are associated with
abuse and violence against women.”321 In her study, Nichols found that only
those advocates who self-identified as feminist had intersectional ideologies
institutionalized self-critique initiated by those arms of the state that are outside the impartiality-oriented
‘ethic of justice.’ In this sense, a critique of the impartiality-oriented aspects of the state is immanent
within this mode of service delivery.” Id.
316. See id. at 328 (noting that “[p]rofessionalization may . . . be accompanied by a de-radicalization
of domestic violence services and an ensuing depoliticization of the movement”).
317. McLaughlin, supra note 255, at 60 (discussing how social workers are marginalized or punished
within organizations that do not support, or fail to understand, their social justice advocacy goals).
318. See, e.g., Nichols, supra note 273, at 193–94 (discussing the relationship between social justice
advocacy and organizational practices).
319. Id.
320. Id. at 182.
321. Id.
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(e.g., explained to Nichols how intersecting identities related to victimization and
advocacy).322 Also, “social change activism was absent among all the self-
identified non-feminist advocates.”323
Drawing on these findings, we can conclude, not too surprisingly, that ideology
might play an important role in the social justice practices and commitments of
advocates generally. Training and programing around social justice goals may be
even more important. Nichols found that all the advocates in her study, including
non-feminists, engaged in survivor-defined advocacy practices, and attributes
this to lingering feminist influence at the organizational level, for example, in
training and programming.324 She concludes that advocacy approaches were not
entirely dependent on the self-identified ideologies of advocates. Moreover,
including intersectional and social change ideologies in training and programing
could ostensibly cultivate related advocacy practices in non-feminist advo-
cates.325 Ideological consensus may not be required for a successful counter-
hegemonic access to justice project; however, informing all training and
programs with social justice goals and objectives would be. This reimagined,
counter-hegemonic access to justice project will be shaped and defined by its
commitment to social justice.
The next Part begins exploring what an access to justice program built on the
principles of social justice advocacy might look like, both in terms of the nature
of services provided and program decision-making and structure. The proposals
that follow are not intended to be exhaustive but are offered as core parts of a
framework for reimagining access to justice—an initial foray into a new
approach, drawn from principles of social justice advocacy. This framework can
apply to a variety of access to justice programs, including those that involve
attorney representation, and may be implemented in whole or in part, as part of a
plan for comprehensive reform, new program development, or incremental
change. The goal in each case is to reorient program goals and objectives to a
social justice advocacy perspective: specifically, one that promotes social justice
in poor people’s courts. Staff members in such a program may or may not also act
as advocates with, or on behalf of, particular litigants in the context of an
advocate–client relationship. However, in all cases, they are within an advocacy
role. To capture the presence of an advocacy stance, or partiality, that transcends
but also incorporates individual advocacy relationships, the next Part uses the
term “client–litigant” when referring to individuals using access to justice-
program services under the new, proposed framework.
322. Id. at 187.
323. Id. at 192.
324. Id. at 193.
325. Id. at 193–94.
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IV. BUILDING A NEW ACCESS TO JUSTICE MODEL
A. Providing Services as Social Justice Advocates
The foundational principles of a reimagined access to justice project emerge
from the advocacy models and types of expertise outlined above. First, each of
the models—social justice lawyering, social work, and lay advocacy for
survivors—demonstrates the potential for providing valuable assistance from a
social justice advocacy perspective, even when litigants are not represented by an
attorney in court. Social justice advocacy takes many shapes and forms.326
Second, social workers and lay advocates demonstrate the ability of non-lawyers
to offer meaningful, social justice-informed, legal and non-legal advocacy that
complements lawyer advocates in ways that may increase the overall effective-
ness of legal services.327 Third, the social justice practices and commitments
shared by each of these models indicate that such assistance will be empowerment-
based and will aim to better enable the poor to resist subordination.328
These models suggest that an access to justice program should work to
empower litigants to resist practices and procedures that facilitate the operation
of bias in poor people’s courts and counteract the dignitary harms perpetrated in
court settings by treating litigants with dignity and respect.329 In order to address
the interrelated nature of poor people’s legal problems and the impacts of
intersecting systems, it will move away from a case-based and reactive focus, and
326. Indeed, the most important part of social justice advocacy may be providing an opportunity for
deliberation, rather than the provision of legal services. See White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 35, at
732 (illustrating this principle with a description of a legal clinic in a South African village ran by the
community).
327. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 210, at 988 (describing the benefits of interdisciplinary practice).
328. See supra Part III (describing the empowerment-based focus in social justice lawyering, social
work, and lay advocacy); see also Gabel & Harris, supra note 30, at 375–76 (advocating for an approach
that counters the profound alienation experienced within hegemonic social institutions by “expanding
political consciousness through using the legal system to increase people’s sense of personal and political
power”).
329. See supra note 256 and accompanying text (observing that an egalitarian and respectful
relationship between lawyers and clients is a basic principle of social justice advocacy). The importance
to a counter-hegemonic project of working to counteract dignitary harms is emphasized by Gabel and
Harris, who observe, “the experience of minor lawsuits is one of the few times that most people actually
encounter the public sphere directly, and the experience almost always intensifies the alienation they
already feel. The degrading and manipulative way that these cases are routinely processed . . . only
increases people’s sense of hopelessness about politics and about human nature in general.” Gabel &
Harris, supra note 30, at 396. Therefore, attention to these goals should inform every point of contact
between client–litigants and access to justice services and programs. See LOPEZ, supra note 192, at 98
(observing that even small details “can dictate the very nature of the relationship between the office
worker and the client”). While the implications for service delivery and program organization is well
beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that creating an environment that is courteous,
respectful, and responsive to people’s needs can begin with looking at it from the people’s point of view
and analyzing interactions from the perspective of program or office organization and design. See id. at
97–102.
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seek to connect, rather than to compartmentalize, legal (and non-legal) issues.330
The process of identifying and uncovering these connections is also essential to
the goals of engendering counter-hegemonic consciousness and resistance to
subordination.331 The first opportunity to address these issues is during the intake
process, which should lay the foundation for services in a reimagined access to
justice program.
1. Redesigning Intake to Account for Interrelated Problems
As noted above, most access to justice programs are designed to address legal
problems and issues as they are identified and framed as a legal case by
litigants.332 The process typically begins when the litigant identifies the type of
case for which assistance is needed, such as a divorce, protection order, or an
eviction.333 Intake practices need to move beyond responses designed around a
single issue or presenting problem. Intake is the first opportunity to collect the
information necessary to identify issues in addition to what the client–litigant has
presented, and to gain context necessary to help client–litigants evaluate their
own pre-identified frames and responsive strategies.
This may also be the first opportunity for the client–litigant to consider the
situation with the assistance of someone operating with his or her interests in
mind. Legal frames may be driven by many influences, including coercive
practices by state actors and others.334 It cannot be assumed that litigants have
come to conclusions about legal issues and frames through a decision-making
process superior to an advocate.335 An important part of an advocate’s value is to
assist with sorting through the many factors that may impact a client–litigant’s
decision.336 The intake process should be designed to identify issues that might
330. See supra Part II (describing how typical approaches to access to justice fail to address the way
legal problems arise for low-income people); see also Gabel & Harris, supra note 30, at 396 (describing
the importance of countering the ways that the legal process contributes to social fragmentation and
political alienation by finding common threads among cases).
331. See Gabel & Harris, supra note 30, at 396 (describing the social isolation engendered by legal
processes); see also Rose, supra note 254, at 46–50 (describing the importance of helping clients
contextualize their experience as social and collective rather than individual and isolated).
332. See supra Part II (discussing limitations of access to justice programs).
333. This organization of services also tends to follow the organization of courts, such that a
court-based self-help center will typically provide assistance only with the matters heard in that court.
334. See Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered
Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369, 400–13 (2006) (describing constraints on autonomous client
decision-making). In my experience representing domestic violence survivors, for example, the client’s
initial determination to seek an order of protection was sometimes the result of pressure from a landlord,
employer, or case worker who was threatening the client with adverse action if he or she did not get the
order, rather than the client’s independent determination that the order would make him or her safer.
335. See id.; see also Simon, Dark Secret, supra note 214, 1102–08 (arguing that progressive lawyers
underestimate both their influence and their value).
336. See, e.g., Simon, Dark Secret, supra note 214, at 1105 (observing lawyers help clients reflect on
their goals “by offering a detached perspective”); Kruse, supra note 334 (observing opportunities to
support client autonomy by intervening in client decision making).
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not be captured through a legal lens alone.
It is important to develop intake forms that assess common legal intersections
and areas of vulnerability to state intervention or other adverse consequences
from engagement with the justice system. For example, criminal defender
organizations have developed intake tools that help them identify key issues
related to civil collateral consequences of conviction (such as those related to
immigration status, employment, housing, or family), or that might require other
or additional interventions (such as untreated mental health issues), or implicate
other legal actions or relief.337 The corollary intake form for access to justice
programs working on civil cases would be designed to help staff members
identify the presence of common co-occurring legal or other issues that might
affect analysis of the presenting problem. If the presenting problem is a divorce,
the intake form might inquire about the need for debt counseling or foreclosure
assistance.338 A request for a protective order might inquire about employment
and housing issues339 and whether the applicant seeks financial support from the
adverse party.340 All intake forms would inquire about the existence of other
cases, including criminal charges, in order to identify possible collateral effects.
In each type of case, the intake form would inquire about safety concerns.
Broadening inquiries about safety to cases where the client–litigant has not
identified domestic violence as a concern, and to non-family cases, embraces the
broader concept of violence discussed above, which includes state and commu-
nity violence, and also the violence of subordination. An advantage of this
approach is that it includes issues that are typically triggers for safety planning,
such as domestic violence. However, a discussion of safety is not dependent on
narrower, legal notions of violence, or clients’ understanding of legal terms.341 It
incorporates a wider array of issues that can impact safety, such as economic
insecurity and homelessness, and mental and physical health. Various dimensions
of health may be the subjects of more specific inquiries at intake; the point here is
to focus on their implications for safety, broadly understood, as well as any
337. For example, the Bronx Defenders’ intake checklist includes inquiries about the client’s
immigration and employment status; whether they are living in or applying for public housing; military
service and mental health history; the existence of child welfare issues; and whether there was police
misconduct. See The Bronx Defenders, Checklist (on file with author).
338. See generally MELANCA CLARK & MAGGIE BARRON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FORECLOSURES:
A CRISIS IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION (2009), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Justice/
Foreclosure%20Report/ForeclosuresReport.pdf (describing the widespread impacts of subprime lending
and predatory practices on low-income and African American communities, and the urgent need for legal
assistance with these issues).
339. See Carey, supra note 191.
340. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing the economic impacts of protective
orders).
341. See Stoever, supra note 159, at 348 (“Many women do not recognize the range of physical
behaviors that are illegal and actionable, such as slapping, shoving, or pushing, with one client
commenting to me, ‘I’ve told you about the times he used a gun,’ unmistakably indicating that she
experienced multiple other less lethal forms of violence.”).
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implications related to the client–litigant’s legal case. The goal is to obtain facts
necessary to establish a comprehensive and sound basis for counseling client–
litigants entering (or considering entering) poor people’s courts.
2. Counseling on Impacts, Intersections, and Options
Just as the intersecting nature of the law in poor people’s lives should inform
the intake process, the ways in which systems intersect in poor people’s courts
should inform approaches to counseling and educating client–litigants using
those courts.342 With this context in mind, those counseling client–litigants
should aim to help them decouple or avoid the links between punitive and
potentially supportive state functions. This means educating client–litigants
about the potential connections between systems and the possible consequences
of each course of action. Like every other aspect of this re-imagined access to
justice program, the lens of social justice advocacy is essential for this process to
be empowering rather than potentially debilitating.
For example, an applicant for a protective order with minor children should
understand the potential economic ramifications of the order, any vulnerability to
intervention by a child welfare agency or by the court, and how the order might
impact any other related case. This counseling should be part of a deliberative
process allowing for individualized analysis of both legal and non-legal issues,
including safety.343 It is easy to imagine presenting this type of information in
ways that—intentionally or not—discourage the client–litigant from seeking the
order, or otherwise encourage him or her to take a particular course of action.344
Social justice advocacy supposes mindfulness about the advocate’s role in a
process that facilitates, rather than overpowers, the client–litigant’s decision-
making by providing needed information and support.345 In addition to providing
opportunities for deliberation about individual circumstances with regard to legal
options and possible outcomes, every care should be taken to provide information
342. See supra Part I (describing how poor families are impacted by the intersection of family courts
with the child welfare and criminal justice systems).
343. See supra note 287 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of individualized
counseling on safety issues).
344. See Simon, Dark Secret, supra note 214, at 1103 (arguing that the mainstream attorney bar has
“mistakenly portrayed the practice of counseling as the neutral presentation of information for
autonomous client decision”). Courts, too, feign objectivity when presenting information, which can
more closely resemble indoctrination into court culture and ideology. For example, the Los Angeles
Superior Court requires all parties to a custody dispute to complete a class called “Our Children First”
prior to attending a mandatory mediation session. See Our Children First, SUPERIOR CT. CAL., COUNTY OF
L.A., http://ww2.lacourt.org/ourChildrenFirst/ui/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2015). The class may be
completed online or in person at the courthouse. Id. My clients who attended the class, under its former
iteration called “Parents and Children Together,” reported that it placed a heavy focus on joint custody,
encouraged informal resolution of cases, and discouraged litigation.
345. See supra Part III (describing the role of collaboration in social justice lawyering); see also
Kruse, supra note 334 (describing a plurality of approaches to collaborative lawyer–client decision
making).
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in ways that are sensitive to the potential for influencing the decision-making
process in unintended ways.
Notably, this sensitivity is distinct from services that are delivered by an
ostensibly neutral party, such as legal services under models that presume lawyer
neutrality346 or those that are not advocacy-based, like traditionally conceived
self-help services for unrepresented litigants.347 The posture of neutrality can
hide biases that do not serve the public. The advocacy goal is to support
client–litigants in reaching well-thought-out, informed decisions about how to
proceed with their cases—an advocacy goal. This goal requires the advocate to
engage with the decision-making process as a facilitator with appropriate
expertise.348 Sensitivity to the potential to disempower clients in this context
gives rise to intentionality about position (e.g., that of the client and of the
advocate) and process (e.g., does it reinforce hierarchy or promote equality and
deliberation) rather than a purported withdrawal from the decision-making
process.349
Counseling should also transcend the options available in poor people’s courts in
favor of a broader, problem-solving approach. A social justice advocacy perspective
demands that advocates advise client–litigants in a more comprehensive and holistic
manner than the manner artificially imposed by the structure of the legal system or
practice “silos” created through legal specialization.350 This approach includes
discussion of alternative avenues for relief that might be available to client–litigants in
other courts or administrative forums, as well as non-legal options. It may also include
identifying opportunities for collective action, both through the deliberative process in
particular cases and through observing recurring problems experienced by multiple
client–litigants over time.351 The implications of this broader approach for program
structure and training are discussed below. The breadth of issues identified through
intake and discussed in a deliberative, problem-solving approach to counseling may
extend beyond the types of matters heard in poor people’s courts and the types of
services that can be offered by the specific access to justice program. While addressing
all litigants’ issues is unlikely to be within the ability of any single access to justice
project due to the potential scope of issues raised, many issues may be part of a larger
social change agenda with which the program is ideally affiliated.
346. See Kruse, supra note 334, at 373 (describing an “appearance of neutrality” as a “staple of
client-centered interviewing and counseling techniques”).
347. See supra Part II (noting that self-help is premised on the absence of advocacy).
348. See Simon, Dark Secret, supra note 214, at 1103 (noting that lawyers do more than translate the
law to poor clients; their professional judgment also has value); Kruse, supra note 334, at 415 (discussing
the value of contextualized professional judgment).
349. See Kruse, supra note 334.
350. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 210, at 972 (observing how the field of poverty law has become
siloed, due in part to the creation of separate funding streams for civil and criminal legal assistance and
restrictions on practice).
351. See infra notes 382–83 and accompanying text (discussing the role of service delivery in
obtaining data about community needs).
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3. Educating about Narrative, Rights, and Resistance
Empowering low-income client–litigants also requires educating them about
presenting themselves and their stories to the court. This type of education
includes teaching client–litigants about the language of court, including legal
terminology, and also less formal, but no less important, expectations about
verbal presentation and etiquette.352 Educating client–litigants about the lan-
guage of court also requires exposing underlying ideologies and expectations,
such as the expectation in family courts that good parents will refrain from
making rights claims about children, or that domestic violence survivors are
passive, or the expectation in housing court that tenants deserving of relief from
eviction due to their rental units being uninhabitable have the money to pay
rent.353 This educative process will also help client–litigants make decisions
about presenting stories and claims that challenge normative assumptions and
determine when and how best to reveal facts that run counter to prevailing
norms.354 From the social justice advocacy frame, this educational process is
vital not only for individual litigants, but also for creating new narratives and
norms that more accurately represent the lives of client–litigants in poor people’s
courts.355
Empowerment also requires educating client–litigants about strategically
asserting rights in delegalized court settings. This includes working with
client–litigants to determine when to ask for relief that is disfavored and
engendering informed resistance to common practices. For example, in family
courts, it is common for custody evaluators to ask parents to waive all
doctor–patient privileges for the purpose of the custody investigation.356 For
some client–litigants, this might present a problem, such as making sensitive
medical or psychological information available to an abusive spouse. Consider-
ing the benefits and risks of refusing to waive privilege is important, but
counseling on such issues is outside the scope of most programs offering
352. See Clarke, supra note 132 (observing the importance of unwritten, informal rules of conduct in
legal settings).
353. See supra Part II (discussing the nature of hegemony in the poor people’s courts).
354. See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, When is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She Fights
Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 120–23 (2008) (describing reasons that clients may choose to reveal
experiences that do not conform to the court’s expectations, even when doing so may hurt their case).
355. See id. at 123 (arguing that advocates must find ways to create space for new narratives that
challenge stereotypes). As Goodmark describes regarding stereotypes about battered women: “One
crucial aspect of creating that space is helping judges understand that the paradigmatic victim speaks for
very few battered women . . . . For years, advocates have relied on judicial education to broaden judicial
perspectives on the experiences of battered women, with questionable success. The time has come to try
something new. Telling counter-stories that show judges the diversity of battered women’s experiences
may help us to make that space.” Id. at 123–24.
356. Like other privileges, the doctor–patient privilege can be waived by the holder of the privilege.
See generally Ike Vanden Eykel & Emily Miskel, The Mental Health Privilege in Divorce and Custody
Cases, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LS. 453 (2013).
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assistance to unrepresented litigants.357 The educative process in an access to
justice program informed by social justice advocacy should address different
contexts that arise in particular cases, including appearances before judges,
mediators, investigators, and other court personnel.358 In addition to providing
better support for individual client–litigants, the process of engendering informed
resistance to common court practices helps future client–litigants who challenge
the status quo, as they will no longer be the exception to the rule. Resistance can
help to change practice. If it is no longer easier to reflexively follow informal,
interventionist practices, courts may be more open to change.359
These suggestions also demonstrate the need for ongoing access to justice
services that extend beyond the opening of a case or the filing of specific motions.
Client–litigants need assistance in other appearances and events, such as
investigations and discovery processes, settlement, and trial. A social justice
advocacy approach that empowers litigants in poor people’s courts requires
ongoing education and support throughout the process. Ideally, it also anticipates
potential future issues and addresses them proactively.
4. Developing Proactive Strategies
One of the roles an access to justice program plays (intentionally or not) is in
educating client–litigants about what to do “next time.” For example, client–
litigants may not meet the legal requirements for a desired avenue of relief or a
defense in their first visit to the program, but they learn about what is required if
the situation arises again.360 A more intentional approach to counseling and
educating client–litigants would also address potential future issues that are
implicated by present circumstances. For example, a parent ordered to pay child
support should be advised about the need to seek modification of the order if his
or her financial circumstances change and the problems that may arise (including
the possibility of incarceration) from non-payment.361 Being proactive also
means helping client–litigants consider alternatives outside of what the law might
357. Indeed, I was informed by a family court custody investigator with several years of experience in
the Los Angeles County Superior Court that no parent had ever refused to sign the waiver in his cases.
358. Absent attorney representation, tools to assist client–litigants would also be beneficial; for
example, checklists, handouts, glossaries and trial preparation handbooks, and similar materials. See THE
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH GRP., supra note 144, at 3 (noting that litigants in unlawful detainer cases
sometimes forgot to ask for relief that was available in their case and that they had been instructed about
at the self-help center).
359. See Engler, Context-Based Civil Gideon, supra note 208 (arguing that the self-interests of
stakeholders including courts must be taken into account in order to implement change).
360. For example, most of the tenants facing eviction at one self-help center had received an eviction
notice for failure to pay rent and had no affirmative defenses available. THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH GRP.,
supra note 144, at 12. Nonetheless, these tenants now understand what is required to present an
affirmative defense, such as uninhabitability.
361. See supra Part I (discussing incarceration for nonpayment under felony nonsupport laws). See
also Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 131 (2011).
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provide. For example, this proactive approach could include helping parents in a
private child-support case consider alternatives to a minimum child-support order
if the noncustodial parent is unemployed, in order to avoid arrears accruing on an
order that is, for all practical purposes, unenforceable.362 Proactive strategies can
seek to alleviate problems that arise in the disconnect between life and law and
play a role in devising new solutions.
A proactive social justice approach also includes reaching out to community
members who have not yet sought access to the court, for example, through
community-based education programs.363 These should include programs designed
to reach people, such as inmates, who have difficulty accessing poor people’s
courts and related services.364 Such programs would be designed to teach people
about rights and responsibilities and better prepare them to make decisions about
how to proceed with legal problems. They would also help people understand and
interpret their experiences in the justice system and avoid some of its problems
and pitfalls. Legal education can be a key part of the process of democratization,
in which the public gains the knowledge necessary to understand the legal system
and participate in its reform.365 However, there may be a fine line between
education as part of an empowerment model and merely inculcating the public
with the ideologies and norms of the existing legal system.366 If people are taught
about legal rights and obligations without a critique of their utility or absent
meaningful assistance with enforcement, then education is simply another aspect
of hegemony: making subordination seem more fair because the subordinated
were well-informed but failed to take correct action.367
A discussion at a recent conference of family court judges serves as an
example of the easy shift from a progressive vision to a hegemonic one: during
362. Alternatives could include setting the order to begin after a set amount of time for job training or
a job search; child support might also be waived in lieu of other considerations, like parenting time while
the other parent works in order to save expenses for child care. See Brito, supra note 120, at 665–67
(discussing alternatives to current child support policy approaches).
363. See supra Part III (discussing the centrality of education to social justice lawyering); see also
Alferi, supra note 174 (arguing that legal rights education—along with organization and mobiliza-
tion—is central to “building and recovering community in neighborhoods segregated by concentrated
poverty and race”); Rebecca L. Sandefue, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 9
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 51, 77–79 (2010) (discussing how expanding access to justice might in some
instances be best served by expanding legal education); Bridgette Dunlap, Anyone Can “Think Like A
Lawyer”: How the Lawyers’Monopoly on Legal Understanding Undermines Democracy and the Rule of
Law in the United States, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2817 (2014) (arguing that a broad-based approach to
educating the public about the law will strengthen democracy and compliance with the rule of law).
364. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (concerning restrictions on the practice of law that
prevent inmates from getting necessary civil legal services).
365. See Alferi, supra note 174; Dunlap, supra note 363; MacDowell, Law on the Street, supra note
32 (describing the role of community legal education in educating or reacquainting lawyers with the
experiences of marginalized communities).
366. See MacDowell, Law on the Street, supra note 32, at 287 (noting that the process of legal
education can be disempowering for many).
367. See supra Part III (describing the conditions conducive to developing counter-hegemonic
consciousness).
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the question-and-answer session following a presentation on problems with
approaches to child support arrears that criminalized low-income parents, the
judges’ focus shifted from how to reform the system to how to reach poor people
before they became parents in order to discourage them from having children
they could not afford.368 One suggestion was to educate teens in high school or
junior high about the high financial costs of raising children.369 In the judges’
eyes, the purpose of education became a family court purpose—regulation of the
poor—rather than a transformative, social justice goal, like revealing the cultural
construction of law and engaging young people in trying to challenge systems of
subordination.370 Nor did it include engaging processes to hold the system
accountable. The process of developing and implementing programs will need to
be carefully monitored to make sure that it is not coopted by other, more
conservative institutional agendas.371
Programs must be careful to not let efficiencies in delivering legal services
suppress larger goals of systemic reform.372 This will be especially challenging
insofar as access to justice programs take all comers: it is simply easier to let the
structure of the court and legal system dictate the process rather than to decide
what is needed from a social justice point of view.373 These concerns point
toward the importance of a program structure that supports social justice goals.
B. Structuring Programs to Promote Social Justice Commitments
1. Developing a Social Justice Criteria for Allocation of Resources
How should the reimagined access to justice program determine how to
allocate resources? For example, how should decisions be made about where to
target community education and outreach or which client–litigants require
attorney representation? Should services be expanded to provide broader
coverage or narrowed to allow for deeper focus on key issues? Should the
program offer alternatives to existing services provided by the courts or focus on
reform of existing court practices and programs? The principles of social justice
advocacy suggest that answering these questions requires deep knowledge of
context, including knowledge of poor people’s courts, the present historical
368. See notes on file with author.
369. Id.
370. MacDowell, Law on the Street, supra note 32.
371. See, e.g., infra this Part, discussing the difficulty of maintaining a progressive agenda if
dependent for approval on major community institutions like courts.
372. See Abel, supra note 46, at 575–76 (discussing the pressures on legal aid programs leading to
routinization of services and neglect of law reform goals).
373. See id. at 574 (“It is hard for a legal aid office to turn clients down when it knows that it represents
the last resort, particularly once the office has established an open door policy.”). Abel notes other
pressures leading toward routinization, including the desperate nature of many individual cases, the
desire to prove loyalty to the community, and pressure to neutralize political opposition to services by
appearing neutral. Id. at 576.
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moment, and community conditions.374 No set of criteria can or should provide
absolute answers regarding priorities, especially in this shifting landscape.375
However, the context of poor people’s courts suggests two guiding principles for
a decision-making criteria in a reimagined access to justice program addressing
subordination and seeking social justice.
First, the criteria will prioritize responses to individuals and groups who are
most vulnerable to harm. The poor people’s courts tend to reinforce subordina-
tion through intertwined processes of informality (creating opportunity for bias,
lack of transparency, and undermining the effectiveness of counter-measures),
interventionism (expanding state power and undermining autonomy), and
intersecting systems (leading to punitive state action).376 The overall culture and
practices of poor people’s courts contribute to demoralization and social
marginalization of low-income people through rituals of public humiliation that,
while a collective experience (that is, one which all poor people may be subjected
to), tend to further isolate individuals within the particularities of their legal
case.377 Those who are most vulnerable are those who are already subject to
multiple forms of institutional and structural subordination.378 This might
include, for example, low-income client–litigants in family court who are
incarcerated and have an especially hard time participating in their cases and
overcoming bias; those whose immigration status renders them vulnerable to
deportation if their civil case results in contact with the criminal justice system;
and those whose eviction case may worsen a child welfare case.
Addressing the most vulnerable constituencies also includes targeting assis-
tance to client–litigants whose identity, experiences, or claims are otherwise
counter to institutional expectations or norms. This category might lead to
focusing on assistance for LGBT family issues; programs to address potential
bias in domestic violence cases involving client–litigants who do not fit the
stereotype of the “perfect victim” (such as those who are gay or lesbian, are of
color, or have a criminal record), or alleged abusers who fit stereotypes of
perpetrators (such as men of color, and those with a criminal history); and
housing cases for indigent renters with habitability claims or those with cases ripe
for collective action. Within these broad categories, other factors may further
refine decision-making about resource allocation.379 The most important consid-
374. See, e.g., LOPEZ, supra note 192, at 66–67; see also text accompanying note 231 (discussing the
importance of community history for social justice lawyering goals).
375. See Cahn & Cahn, supra note 194, at 1346 (opining that a criterion “can do no more than suggest
when a case might help a community or an individual to shake off a paralyzing sense of despair and
helplessness”).
376. See supra Part I (describing the family courts in historical context).
377. See supra Part II (describing degradation ceremonies in the poor people’s courts).
378. See supra Part I (describing the intersectional impacts of the family courts); supra Part II
(discussing the ways in which poor people’s courts reinforce social hierarchies).
379. See, e.g., Cahn & Cahn, supra note 194, at 1347–48 (identifying factors for a legal services
program to consider when choosing cases).
No. 3] 535Reimagining Access to Justice
eration will be the program’s purpose of promoting social justice and challenging
hegemony. That goal suggests that vulnerability to harm should generally be
related to a broader pattern of institutional bias or another structural issue, in
order to draw significant program resources.
Second, applying the decision-making criteria will be informed by data from
the community. This means data gained through observation and experience with
client–litigants as well as data obtained by other means.380 Serving low-income
communities provides an important opportunity to keep abreast of trends and
patterns in the community that relate to hierarchy and social marginalization, and
this data should be tracked and used for priority setting.381 Gathering information
for priority setting may also include active efforts to get the input of affected
community members.382 Data and other input regarding resource allocation must
be assessed with the overarching program goals in mind, rather than giving
preference to any particular criterion or privileging any one viewpoint.383
Engaging multiple viewpoints within multidisciplinary programs is also helpful.
2. Decentering Expertise and Maximizing Interaction
The reimagined access to justice program may include staff members from
different advocacy backgrounds, including attorneys, social workers, and lay
advocates, who each play a role in providing services in a variety of possible
configurations. Addressing the harms of poor people’s courts suggests the
importance of structuring these relationships so as to appropriately utilize, yet
decenter, any single professional or lay expertise, and to maximize interaction so
that client–litigants and service providers can learn from one another across areas
of expertise. These structural concerns arise from several interrelated issues.
Addressing the courts’ role in demoralizing and alienating requires providing
380. See Steinberg, supra note 210, at 989–90 (“When deciding what services to offer and what
partnerships to create [providers] should be careful not to make assumptions about the needs of the client
population. Instead, [they] must begin to gather hard, statistical data in order to understand what
resources should be incorporated to strengthen services and connect better with the community.”).
381. For example, Steinberg reports that the Bronx Defenders “knew that clients were in desperate
need of housing because the court intake form asks for a ‘permanent address’ and we saw how often our
clients checked ‘homeless’ or ‘none.’ But we had no way of knowing how often our clients were
investigated by child-welfare agencies, or how often removal petitions were brought in family court.
After collecting the data from our clients in a systematic way, we learned how prevalent child-welfare
interactions were and how often our clients’ children were being placed in foster care, often as a result of
a criminal charge.” Id. at 989. As a result, the organization decided to integrate a family defense practice
into their services. Id. at 989–90.
382. Cf. Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor
Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1009 (2000) (proposing that legal responses to domestic
violence be shaped with reference to the needs and concerns of those communities most vulnerable to
both interpersonal and state violence).
383. See Cahn & Cahn, supra note 194, at 1348–49 (noting that any criteria must be approached
carefully so as not to improperly influence making or rejecting decisions about rendering legal assistance,
and discussing dangers from misapplication of criteria).
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opportunities to develop counter-hegemonic consciousness, which emerges from
learning about shared experiences within social hierarchies.384 Social justice
models emphasize nonhierarchical models of collaboration and learning, which
require a structure that facilitates interaction among participants. This structure
will also maximize the benefits offered by different forms of expertise (including
the lay expertise offered by client–litigants) and provide a non-hierarchical,
collaborative model appropriate for a counter-hegemonic project.
Structuring the program to include planned opportunities for interaction can
involve anything from open community meetings to classes and clinics designed
to promote discussion among participants. These should be implemented with
strategies to support community organization by uncovering political issues
underlying seemingly personal and isolated problems, such as divorce or
eviction.385 These approaches would seek to break down, when possible, the
isolating effects of traditional law practice, which focuses narrowly on communi-
cation between clients and attorneys.
Maximizing interaction and collaboration can also take the form of organizing
program staff into interdisciplinary teams. As described by Steinberg, a team
model facilitates effective interdisciplinary communication and collaboration by
“encourag[ing] each advocate to seek advice and assistance from a variety of
experts, depending on the needs of the client, and regular team meetings provide
an opportunity to highlight examples of effective interdisciplinary communica-
tion and collaboration.”386 The program can develop and promote interdisciplin-
ary skills and exchanges by cross-training advocates, including training in areas
outside their expertise, and shadowing and collaborative practice with members
from other advocacy areas.387 Structuring a program to maximize interaction also
includes the design of physical spaces, from waiting rooms to work spaces, in
order to allow for and encourage communication and collaboration.388
Finally, social justice advocacy principles point toward the importance of
developing capacity for agency and leadership in low-income communities,
rather than dependence. This requires that client–litigants not just passively
receive services, but also learn leadership skills and participate in leadership
activities.389 Opportunities for client–litigants to take leadership roles in program
activities might include returning to the program to teach or co-teach a class after
completing their case. It may also include enlisting client–litigants in structural-
reform efforts beyond their case. These opportunities can be relatively large (such
384. See supra notes 265–76 and accompanying text (describing the prerequisites for developing
counter-hegemonic consciousness).
385. See Gabel & Harris, supra note 30, at 396–98 (describing strategies for politicization of common
cases).
386. See Steinberg, supra note 210, at 992.
387. See id. at 995.
388. See id. at 992.
389. See Cahn & Cahn, supra note 194, at 1332 (referring to the need to cultivate individuals “who are
capable of articulating the demands and concerns of their ‘constituency’”).
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as joining a community campaign for legislative reform) or small (such as writing
a letter to court administrators about a problem with court staff that arose during
the case). Structuring the program to provide such opportunities for education
and mobilization is consistent with goals of empowerment and social change at
the heart of a reimagined access to justice program. These transformative goals
also point to the need for structural independence for an access to justice program
with a social justice mission.
3. Maintaining Organizational Independence
In order to maintain its social justice orientation, the reimagined access to
justice program will need to be organizationally independent of the courts. This is
true for several reasons. First, social justice advocacy requires freedom to
represent marginalized community members and implement social justice goals.
The program cannot be beholden to the very institutions it seeks to reform. As
Edgar S. Cahn and Jean Camper Cahn observe, “The law’s capacity to create
issues, to bring controversies into focus, tends to make . . . legal services too
controversial for an organization to absorb if it must retain the support, or at least
the sufferance, of the major institutions in a city.”390 Here, a partnership with
poor people’s courts to provide access to justice services is an impossible conflict
of interest. Courts want access to justice programs to make dealing with
unrepresented litigants easier on the institution and its constituent parts while
maintaining the status quo. This may be palatable for an access to justice program
that is focused on access alone. However, access to justice as a counter-
hegemonic, social justice practice seeks to challenge and change the status quo in
poor people’s courts. While the interests of the program and court may sometimes
overlap, each have fundamentally different positions, and a partnership between
them cannot help but dilute the goals of the social justice enterprise. Access to
justice programs should be organizationally independent of the courts, operation-
ally and fiscally.
Second, organizing access to justice programs around court organization and
legal specialization does not fulfill the needs of client–litigants, which transcend
these categories. This concern suggests that such programs should also be sited in
a manner physically separate from the courts, if possible. Siting the program in a
convenient location separate from the poor people’s court might better afford the
opportunity to develop a program that reflects client–litigant needs rather than
court structure. A separate location might also help instill confidence in the
community that the program was truly independent and not an extension of the
state.
In addition to maintaining organizational and physical independence from the
courts, the reimagined access to justice project should avoid over-concentration
390. Id. at 1349.
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and monopolization of services. There is a tendency in legal and social services
toward consolidation of services that may endanger social justice commitments.
Examples include efforts to provide comprehensive services to entire communi-
ties,391 programs aimed at consolidating services for a particular problem or set
of problems, like family violence,392 and movements to unify courts.393 The
danger here, as with program–court partnerships, is dilution of the program’s
social justice mission through alliance with organizations and institutions with
incompatible perspectives, goals and objectives.394
Consolidation of access to justice services within a larger plan for coordinated
or comprehensive services may also have the effect of removing decision-making
from those most in touch with program context and needs, fostering risk aversion
rather than innovation and slowing program implementation.395 Over-
consolidation of services may result in problems similar to those caused by other
forms of monopoly, including “insulation from the democratic market place[,]
. . . relative immunity from criticism and evaluation, and [lack of] genuine
responsiveness to consumer demand.”396 While consolidation and coordination
of services has obvious benefits, such as avoiding duplication of services and
possibly expanding resources and increasing efficiency,397 experience suggests
that organizational independence with informal or more limited partnerships will
better protect social justice goals. These considerations also point to the
importance of organizational structures to promote accountability.
4. Promoting Accountability
Social justice advocacy involves constant self-evaluation and assessment of
strategy to determine if current practices are effective. The reimagined access to
justice program must develop practices and procedures to evaluate its progress
and ensure accountability to its goals. The evaluative criteria for such a project
would look different than the criteria for a program that merely provides access to
the courts. It would evaluate more than the delivery of services. Informed by the
391. See id. at 1318–20 (describing Community Progress Incorporated (CPI), a comprehensive
program located in New Haven, CT).
392. For example, the Family Justice Center movement seeks to provide survivors of family violence
(including elder abuse, domestic violence, and sexual assault) with “one stop shopping” by putting law
enforcement officers, district attorneys, social service providers, and legal assistance in one location. See
History of the Family Justice Center Movement, FAM. JUST. CTR. ALLIANCE, http://www.familyjusticecenter.
org/index.php/history.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2015).
393. See, e.g., Elizabeth L. MacDowell, When Courts Collide: Integrated Domestic Violence Courts
and Court Pluralism, 20 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95 (2011) (regarding integrated domestic violence courts).
These often also include efforts to consolidate related services at the court site. Id. at 117.
394. See Cahn & Cahn, supra note 194, at 1321 (noting that other organizations may have a
“professional service orientation” that runs counter to the empowerment objectives of social justice
advocacy).
395. See id. at 1325–26
396. Id. at 1322.
397. Id.
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goals of social justice advocacy and counter-hegemonic practice, it would also
examine whether the program’s efforts reduce punitive practices, unwanted
interventions, and the influence of bias, while increasing judicial compliance
with the law. It would also develop methods to examine whether client–litigants
are empowered to address the problems that brought them to the program.398
Evaluation and accountability in this context requires not only periodic
assessment of program performance but also constant critical engagement with
the justice system and with client–litigants. Just as the reimagined program must
engage in dynamic interaction with client–litigants in order to help shape and
respond to legal issues, it must connect its services to structural reform efforts in
order to achieve meaningful change and to assess its effectiveness. This
engagement can take many forms and occur (sometimes simultaneously) at micro
and macro levels.
Court-watch programs afford an important example. These are programs
where staff or volunteers observe court proceedings and collect information
about court practices.399 Information gathered in court-watch programs can be
used internally to understand outcomes in cases, to create new practices for
advocates, and to guide allocation of program resources, and externally, to
promote change.400 For example, the King County Sexual Assault Resource
Center in Washington used information from its court-watch program to identify
judges who were not following the law or who favored parties who were
represented by counsel.401 Using a procedure authorized by statute, lay advocates
utilized this information to determine when to request that counsel be appointed
for clients who appeared in front of those judges.402 The Center also distributed
its findings to all King County Superior Court Judges, and subsequent observa-
tions found some improvement in judicial practices.403 System-monitoring
programs like court watch operate simultaneously at the level of data collection,
program assessment, and system reform.
The reimagined access to justice program must create or support ongoing
mechanisms to evaluate and resolve system conflicts. These include structures
and channels for ongoing communication, feedback, and critique among system
398. Examples of such methods come from innovative work with domestic violence survivors. See,
e.g., Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order Coverage: A Call for Reform,
23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 117 n.155, 121 n.176 (2005) (citing studies).
399. See Laura Jones, Court Monitoring as Advocacy, 16 CONNECTIONS 7, 7–11 (2012), available
at http://www.wcsap.org/sites/wcsap.huang.radicaldesigns.org/files/uploads/resources_and_pubs/
connections_2012_10/Connections_2012_10.pdf.
400. See id. at 8–9 (describing internal and external use of data obtained by a court watching
program); THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH GRP., supra note 144, at 16 (noting that court watch programs can be
used as a tool for interpreting judicial responses and devise more effective responses).
401. Jones, supra note 399, at 8.
402. Id. at 8–9.
403. Id.
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participants and stakeholders.404 This can occur through formal structures, such
as community boards, councils, and task forces, and less formal processes, such
as day-to-day advocacy on behalf of individuals or groups within legal and social
service institutions. Elizabeth Ben-Ishai argues that, with mechanisms for this
type of communication in place, the system “is endowed with a mode of
imminent self-critique” that helps build or maintain accountability among the
system’s constituent parts and acts as a “check” on otherwise oppressive state
functions.405 That may be an overly optimistic view, and other modes of ensuring
accountability are undoubtedly necessary—especially with regard to recalcitrant
system participants. Increased accountability of the program and the larger
system are intertwined, and requires a multidimensional and interactive approach.
CONCLUSION
This article makes a case for a more radical and comprehensive approach to
access to justice that focuses on promoting social justice and systemic change.
This approach requires a significant shift in focus, a reimagining of what is
needed to address the needs of low-income litigants in poor people’s courts. The
recommendations above respond to growing concern about the impacts of poor
people’s courts on vulnerable populations—including concern among many
judges and other court personnel and system participants.406 These recommenda-
tions also respond to concerns among progressive lawyers, scholars, and activists
about increasingly punitive policies toward the poor—policies that cannot be
addressed by focusing on access to legal systems alone.407 The problems in poor
people’s courts require an approach to access to justice that takes coercive state
power squarely into account.
This counter-hegemonic project has far reaching implications. In some
instances, implementing the new approach will require reform of policies related
to the delivery of legal and other support services. A social justice advocacy
approach includes, but does not necessarily require, direct legal representation of
client–litigants. It does require that the project of providing access to justice be
approached from the point of view of an advocate for low-income people in poor
people’s courts. Social justice advocacy models show the value of providing
individualized assistance and the value of assistance provided by non-attorney
advocates. While access to justice programs would ideally provide for collabora-
404. See Ben-Ishai, supra note 315, at 312–13 (discussing how such mechanisms can help create a
“check on potentially paternalistic and confining modes of service delivery” in state systems).
405. Id. at 313.
406. For example, the National Association of Juvenile and Family Court Judges’ project, Courts
Catalyzing Change, is engaging local courts in a concerted effort to stem the tide of disproportionate
removal of children from poor families of color in abuse and neglect cases in family court. See Courts
Catalyzing Change, NAT’L COUNCIL JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, http://www.ncjfcj.org/our-work/courts-
catalyzing-change (last visited Mar. 6, 2015).
407. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
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tion among an interdisciplinary team, including attorneys who provide essential
strategic expertise, this will not always be possible. Rules prohibiting the
unauthorized practice of law may need to be reassessed in order to allow
non-attorney advocates to provide valuable advocacy services, including legal
advice.408 Policies regarding privilege for communications between client–
litigants and non-attorney advocates may need to be reexamined. The reimagined
access to justice model also requires thinking deeply about conflicts of interest
and other ethical issues raised by new advocacy relationships and ways of
configuring services.409
In addition, a new approach has to create new narratives about the purpose of
access to justice work in poor people’s courts—narratives that do not rely on false
notions of self-reliance but that incorporate concepts of support and empower-
ment drawn from the rich traditions of social justice advocacy found in
progressive lawyering, social work, and lay advocacy. Constructing these
narratives may also indicate the value of renaming services for unrepresented
litigants. For example, under the new model, self-help services might be more
aptly named “pro se support” or “pro se advocacy.” New narratives will also be
necessary for client–litigants that do not fit the models of the “worthy poor” or
“perfect victim” on which policy initiatives and fundraising efforts so often rely.
These narratives will replace historical notions freighted with the baggage of
intersectional subordination and will articulate new notions of human value and
vulnerability in historical and social context.
Ultimately, this also suggests the need to reimagine legal education: to produce
lawyers who better understand poverty, and the interconnected nature of legal
problems affecting low-income people; to remove silos between doctrinal and
practice areas; and to foster empathy and cultural competency in the legal
profession.410 Beyond that, it requires imagining and creating deep social change.
Working for justice means working to dismantle systems of subordination and
developing alternative structures for social empowerment. Access to justice
programs can embody these goals and serve to reveal the social construction of
power and empower low-income people to resist subordination.
It is possible to implement this vision. Models for policy reforms are
already in place in some jurisdictions, for example, in states allowing lay
advocates to assist clients in court411 and protecting their communications as
408. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
409. See, e.g., Galowitz, supra note 210, at 2135–44 (discussing ethical issues in multidisciplinary
settings); Hurder, supra note 17 (discussing rationales for limiting provisions of legal services by
non-lawyers); Steinberg, supra note 210 (describing arguments against permitting limited scope
representation).
410. Progressive lawyers, teachers, and scholars have long called for such reforms. See generally
Wexler, supra note 2 (arguing that law schools do not prepare lawyers to represent poor people).
411. See, e.g., Weisz, supra note 211 (describing provisions for lay legal advocacy for sexual assault
survivors in Washington).
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confidential.412 There are already legal services programs in place that have
successfully implemented elements of the framework laid out above, such as
more holistic and interdisciplinary representation,413 demonstrating that a new
approach is possible. Implementing even small changes consistent with the
vision of social justice advocacy for low-income litigants presented here could
make a significant improvement in services, while not requiring a change in the
structure of existing programs. For example, intake forms might be revised to
spot safety issues or other legal needs and better guide assistance and referrals.
Staff could be trained about implicit bias and how stereotypes might affect their
responses to litigants. Pamphlets or other materials could be created to inform
litigants about risks posed by intersecting systems and the need for future steps to
avoid adverse consequences. More extensive changes could also be implemented
over time. The first step is to engage in a process of reimaging what access to
justice might look like if undertaken from a social justice advocacy perspective,
with the objective of revealing and transforming the construction of power in the
poor people’s courts.
412. See A.B.A. COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SUMMARY OF DV/SA ADVOCATE CONFIDENTIALITY
LAWS (2007), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/domviol/docs/Advocate
ConfidentialityChart.authcheckdam.pdf (summarizing state laws regarding confidentiality of communi-
cations between domestic violence and sexual assault advocates and their clients).
413. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 210 (describing the holistic and interdisciplinary approach taken
by the Bronx Defenders).
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